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ESSAY
IS PARENTING AUTHORITY A USURPATION OF
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY? HARMONIZING AUTHORITY
FOR, BENEFITS OF, AND LIMITATIONS ON THIS
LEGAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL HYBRID

Joi T. Montiel l
ABSTRACT
A "Parenting Coordinator" assists high-conflict
parents in resolving disputes that arise in the parents'
efforts to jointly parent their children after a divorce. The
Parenting Coordinator simultaneously educates the parents
to minimize the degree and frequency of future conflict.
While Parenting Coordination is not mediation or
arbitration, it is also not counseling. Instead, Parenting
Coordination is a "legal-psychological hybrid."
A trial court's delegation to a parenting coordinator
to determine a fit parent's access to her child is arguably an
improper delegation of judicial authority. While thirteen
states have comprehensive schemes setting out their
Parenting Coordination programs, other states are utilizing
Parenting Coordination without statutory or rule-based
authorization. Appointments without statutory or rule-based
authority are particularly vulnerable to challenge.
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Whether a Parenting Coordinator's appointment is
an improper delegation of judicial authority depends on the
authority for the appointment in the given jurisdiction and
the terms governing the specific appointment. This Article
analyzes the use of Parenting Coordination in jurisdictions
that appoint Parenting Coordinators both with and without
specific authority. From that analysis, this Article offers a
paradigm for constructing an appointment that does not
constitute an improper delegation of judicial authority. The
paradigm will be useful for judges and practitioners
attempting to utilize Parenting Coordination without
specific statutory or rule-based authority. It will also be
useful for courts and legislators considering adoption of a
Parenting Coordinator rule or statute.
The Article proposes that, where a trial court has
some inherent authority to ensure the best interest of the
children, with or without specific statute or rule-based
authority, Parenting Coordination can be sustained.
Combined with the substantial benefits of a qualified
Parenting Coordinator, imposing appropriate limitations on
the Parenting Coordinator's role can incrementally
diminish the argument that the appointment is an improper
delegation of judicial authority. Achieving an appropriate
balance of benefits and limitations, in light of the basis for
appointment authority, achieves a sustainable appointment.
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I. Introduction
A Parenting Coordinator assists high-conflict
parents in resolving disputes that arise in the parents'
efforts to jointly parent their children after a divorce. The
Parenting Coordinator also educates the high-conflict
parents to minimize the degree and frequency of future
conflict. Parenting Coordination is not mediation or
arbitration, or counseling. Instead, Parenting Coordination
is a "legal-psychological hybrid.",2 Because it does not fit
into a category of familiar extra-judicial roles, Parenting
as being an improper
Coordination is subject to challenge
3
delegation of judicial authority.
Whether appointing a Parenting Coordinator is an
improper delegation of judicial authority depends on the
authority for the appointment in the given jurisdiction and
the terms governing the specific appointment. Although
thirteen states have adopted court rules or statutes
authorizing the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator,4
courts in many states are appointing Parenting Coordinators
without authority from a statute or court rule.5 This Article
analyzes the use of Parenting Coordination in jurisdictions
that appoint Parenting Coordinators both with and without
specific authority. From that analysis, this Article offers a
paradigm for constructing an appointment that does not
constitute an improper delegation of judicial authority. The
2 Karl Kirkland & Matthew

J.Sullivan, Parenting Coordination (PC)

Practice: A Survey of Experienced Professionals, 46 FAM. CT. REV.
622, 633 (2008); Matthew J. Sullivan, Ethical, Legal, and Professional
Practice Issues Involved in Acting as a Psychologist Parent
Coordinatorin Child Custody Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 576 (2004).

3Association of Family and Conciliation Courts ("AFCC"), Parenting
Coordination: Implementation Issues, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 533 (2003)

[hereinafter AFCC, Implementation Issues]; Christine A. Coates et al.,
Parenting Coordinationfor High-Conflict Families, 42 FAM. CT. REV.
246, 249-50 (2004).

4See infra note 28.
5See infra note 29.
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paradigm will be useful for judges and practitioners who
are utilizing Parenting Coordination without specific
statutory or rule-based authority. It will also be useful for
courts and legislatures that are considering adopting a
Parenting Coordinator rule or statute.
II. Background and Summary
Parents have due process rights to make decisions6
about their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, based on the doctrine of parenspatriae, the state
may in certain instances permissibly invade the otherwise
high walls of the family in the best interest of the children.
Given the parents' submission to a court's jurisdiction in a
divorce proceeding, it is accepted that a trial court judge
will make decisions regarding the parents' access to their
children. However, when the trial court judge delegates the
power to determine a fit parent's access to her child to a
third party such as a lawyer or a psychologist who has not
been selected in the same manner that a member of the
judiciary has been selected, 7 the decision-making by that
third-party delegee raises concern.
Nevertheless, when parties divorce, people other
than the judge, the parents, their lawyers, and the children
frequently become involved in the process. For example,
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem, special master,
custody evaluator, or mediator. Courts frequently delegate

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) ("[Tlhe Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children.").
7See Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 851 (Utah 1994) (stating
that non-judges cannot properly be assigned core judicial duties
because "[t]here are no provisions which subject them to the
constitutional checks and balances imposed upon duly appointed judges
of courts of record.").
6
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what might appear to be judicial functions, even decisionmaking authority, to such third parties.
A relatively new third-party delegee is the Parenting
Coordinator. 8 A Parenting Coordinator assists high-conflict
parents after their divorce in resolving disputes that arise in
implementing the parenting aspect of their divorce
judgment. Parenting Coordinators also educate the parents
to minimize the degree and frequency of future conflict.
The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts
("AFCC") defines Parenting Coordination as:
[A] child-focused alternative dispute resolution
process in which a mental health or legal
professional with mediation training and
experience assists high-conflict parents to
implement their parenting plan by facilitating the
resolution of their disputes in a timely manner,
educating parents about their children's needs, and
with prior approval of the parties and/or the court,
8

Although the role of a Parenting Coordinator is somewhat similar

across jurisdictions, the nomenclature used in the various jurisdictions
has "almost been one for each different jurisdiction." Karl Kirkland,
Parenting Coordination (PC) Laws, Rules, and Regulations: A
Jurisdictional Comparison, 5 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 25, 28 (2008)
[hereinafter Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and Regulations]. The AFCC
has noted that a Parenting Coordinator may be called a "special master"
in California, a "med-arbiter" in Colorado, a "wiseperson" in New
Mexico, a "custody commissioner" in Hawaii, to list a few. AFCC,
Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 534 n.3. This difference in
nomenclature has been recognized as a problem; inconsistent
nomenclature has been found to be a risk for board complaints and civil
lawsuits against the Parenting Coordinator, presumably because the
inconsistency causes parties to misunderstand the role. Karl Kirkland &
Kale E. Kirkland, Risk Management and Aspirational Ethics for
ParentingCoordinators,3 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 23, 30-31 (2008) (in a

section of the article cleverly entitled "A Rose by any other name does
not smell as sweet"). The AFCC Parenting Coordination study group
has recommended the use of the term "Parenting Coordinator." Id.
(citing AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 533).

369
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making decisions within the scope of the court
order or appointment contract.9
Although it might be viewed as an alternative dispute
resolution process, Parenting Coordination is not mediation
or arbitration. It is also not counseling. Parenting
Coordination is a "legal-psychological hybrid."' 0 Because
the role of a Parenting Coordinator does not conform to the
role of any familiar extra-judicial delegee such as a
mediator or special master, Parenting Coordination is
subject to challenge as being an improper delegation of
authority, "
legislative
lacking
authority
judicial
particularly where no statute or court rule specifically
authorizes the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator.
While thirteen states have comprehensive schemes
setting out their Parenting Coordination programs,1 2 other
states are utilizing Parenting Coordination without statutory
or rule-based authorization.' 3 The results of implementing a
Parenting Coordination program on such an ad hoc basis
are inefficient testing of the legality of Parenting
Coordination 14 and inconsistent use of Parenting
9 AFCC Task Force on Parenting Coordination, Guidelines for
Parenting Coordination, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 164, 165 (2006)
[hereinafter AFCC, Guidelines].
10Kirkland & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 633; Matthew J. Sullivan,
supra note 2, at 576.
1 Coates et al., supra note 3, at 249-50; AFCC: Implementation Issues,
supra note 3, at 533.
12 See infra note 28.
13 See infra note 29.
14 A leader in the Parenting Coordination movement and an attorney in
Oklahoma, the first state to pass a Parenting Coordination law, noted
that in the process of developing a Parenting Coordination program in
Oklahoma, they realized that they had to have a new law to legally do
what they were trying to do. Without a new law allowing for a
Parenting Coordinator, a court cannot delegate decision-making
authority to a third party that invades the "high walls of the family."
Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 29.

370
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Coordination, thus diminishing the perceived and actual
utility of Parenting Coordination. 15 Parenting Coordination,
properly utilized, provides substantial benefits for dueling
divorced parents, their children, and the court system.
However, if Parenting Coordination is hastily implemented
on an ad hoc basis - without fully considering the basis for
the authority and the proper limitations on the role confusion among parties, practitioners, and courts will
result,' 6 the "brand"' 17 of Parenting Coordination will be
damaged, and the opportunity to reap the benefits from
Parenting Coordination will be lost. Thus, the paradigm

15Elayne E. Greenberg, Fine Tuning the Branding of Parenting
Coordination: "... You May Get What You Need," 48 FAM. CT. REV.
206, 206 (Jan. 2010) (asking how Parenting Coordination professionals
might address the "cacophony of discordant expectations and disparate
practices about parenting coordination that are eroding the integrity of
the parenting coordination process"). But see Karl Kirkland, Positive
Coping Among Experienced Parenting Coordinators: A Recipe for
Success, 7 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 61, 64 (2010) [hereinafter Kirkland,
Positive Coping] (opining that the diversity of experience "ultimately
benefits the larger practice community" by providing learning
opportunities through the comparison of the varying practices but also
recognizing that there should be "movement toward greater uniformity"
in the practice of Parenting Coordination).
16Leslie Ellen Shear, In Search of Statutory Authority for Parenting
Coordination Orders in California: Using a Grass-roots, Hybrid
Model Without an Enabling Statute, 5 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 88, 91
(2008) (stating that appointment of a Parenting Coordinator "requires
clear, highly-detailed ground rules, so that the litigants and a nonlawyer PC will understand them, know what to expect, and understand
the waivers of formal due process rights"). "Litigation and appeals to
resolve ambiguities, inconsistencies and uncertainties about the scope
of the PC's authority ...will defeat the purposes of the appointment."
id. It has been suggested to the author by practicing attorneys that they
and their clients are reluctant to object to the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator for fear of alienating the Parenting Coordinator
whose decisions will be so vital to the parties' relationships with their
children.
17Greenberg, supra note 15, at 209.
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offered in this Article should be carefully considered in
advance of an appointment.
This Article proposes that a trial court can use
Parenting Coordination, without a Parenting Coordination
statute or court rule, in circumstances where a trial court
has some inherent authority to ensure the best interest of
the children. Combined with the substantial benefits of a
qualified Parenting Coordinator, imposing appropriate
limitations on the Parenting Coordinator's role can
incrementally diminish the argument that the appointment
is an improper delegation of judicial authority. In light of
the basis for appointment authority, reaching an appropriate
balance of benefits and limitations achieves a sustainable
appointment.
Part III of this Article acknowledges the argument
that Parenting Coordination might constitute an improper
delegation of judicial authority. Part IV of this Article
recognizes that lack of statutory or rule-based authority for
the appointment poses an additional obstacle for Parenting
Coordination. However, even where authority for the
appointment is somewhat lacking, Parenting Coordination
is defensible if appropriately limited because of the benefits
it bestows.
The benefits of Parenting Coordination are
discussed in Part V. In determining the sustainability of a
Parenting Coordination appointment, the benefits that
Parenting Coordination can provide must be accorded due
weight. Most importantly, Parenting Coordination benefits
the children of high-conflict parents. Exposure to conflict
is one of the most detrimental factors in a child's postdivorce development, and it is the State's duty to ensure the
furtherance of the best interest of those children. Second,
Parenting Coordination benefits the judicial system by
preventing the trial court from becoming a revolving door
for the high-conflict parents that Parenting Coordination
serves. Third, Parenting Coordination benefits the highconflict parents themselves by providing a timely and cost-
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effective means of dispute resolution that also educates the
parents in ways to avoid or resolve conflict on their own in
the future.
Significantly, as discussed in Part VI of this Article,
a Parenting Coordinator must have adequate qualifications
so that he can provide the benefits referenced above. Those
benefits may be realized only when the Parenting
Coordinator has adequate qualifications to serve in the
"legally-psychological hybrid" role of a Parenting
Coordinator. If the Parenting Coordinator does not have
adequate qualifications, the proposition of this Article does
not hold true. The Parenting Coordinator's ability to
provide benefits are a significant part of the equation:
benefits of Parenting Coordination combined with
limitations on Parenting Coordination overcome the
arguments against Parenting Coordination considered here.
Limitations on Parenting Coordination are
discussed in Parts VII through X of this Article. These
limitations on Parenting Coordination abate the argument
that the appointment is an improper delegation of judicial
authority. First, as addressed in Part VII, a Parenting
Coordinator should be appointed only after a trial court has
entered a custody order, and the Parenting Coordinator's
role should therefore be limited to disputed issues regarding
implementation of that trial court's order. Second, as
discussed in Part VIII, a Parenting Coordinator should be
appointed only under certain conditions, such as consent of
the parties or a trial court finding that the parents are "high
conflict," so that the appointment is in the best interest of
the children who would be otherwise exposed to chronic
conflict. Third, as discussed in Part IX, a Parenting
Coordinator's decision, if he has decision-making
authority, should always be subject to review by the
appointing court. Thus, the trial court retains its judicial
authority. As addressed in Part X, Parenting Coordination
can be even further limited by allowing a Parenting
Coordinator to decide only minor issues, which might be
373
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specified by the appointing court or by court rule or statute,
where there is one. Some jurisdictions further limit the
instances in which a Parenting Coordinator may have
decision-making authority by requiring that the parties
specifically consent to the Parenting Coordinator's
decision-making authority, a step further than consent to
the appointment, before the Parenting Coordinator may
have that authority.
Combined with the substantial benefits of a
qualified Parenting Coordinator, imposing appropriate
limitations on the Parenting Coordinator's role can
incrementally diminish the argument that the appointment
is an improper delegation of judicial authority, and a
sustainable appointment can be achieved even without a
Parenting Coordinator statute or court rule.
III. Problem: Delegation of Judicial Authority
Powers of a court are generally nondelegable.
18See, e.g., Morrow v. Corbin,

8

A

62 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1933)

("[T]he power thus confided to our trial courts must be exercised by
them as a matter of nondelegable duty, that they can neither with nor
without the consent of parties litigant delegate the decision of any
question within their jurisdiction, once that jurisdiction has been
lawfully invoked. . . ."); Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 851
(Utah 1994) (stating that non-judges cannot properly be assigned core
judicial duties because "[t]here are no provisions which subject them to
the constitutional checks and balances imposed upon duly appointed
judges of courts of record"); In re S.H., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 465, 471 n.l I
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ("Under the separation of powers doctrine judicial
powers may not be completely delegated to, or exercised by, either
nonjudicial officers or private parties.") (citing Cal. Const., art. II, § 3
and Cal. Const. art. VI, § 1); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Kendrick, 780 So. 2d 231, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("A trial court
cannot delegate the sole authority to perform 'a purely judicial
function."') (citing Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368, 1371 (Fla. 1991));
D'Agostino v. D'Agostino, 54 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
("A court cannot delegate or abdicate, in whole or in part, its judicial
power.") (citing S.K.B. v. J.C.B., 867 S.W.2d 651, 658 (Mo. Ct. App.
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trial court's authority is "constrained by the basic
constitutional principle that judicial power may not be
delegated."' 19 However, a trial court may properly delegate
certain limited functions. 20 Although a state's constitution
may generally prohibit the delegation of judicial authority,
the delegation of some authority to a third party may be
permissible or even necessary in some instances.21
1993)); Tabor v. Hogan, 955 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)
("Those enumerated powers are non-delegable[;] [slimply put, the trial
judge may not relinquish them to others.").
'9 Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
20 While a core judicial function cannot be delegated, other duties
might be properly delegated; the courts may receive assistance from
others in performing core judicial functions. "The term 'judicial power
of courts' is generally understood to be the power to hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation;" the
nondelegable judicial powers include the authority to hear and
determine justiciable controversies, the authority to enforce a valid
judgment, and the power necessary to "protect the fundamental
integrity of the judicial branch." In re Adoption of E.H., 103 P.3d 177,
182 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Ohms, 881 P.2d at 181-82 n.6);
see also Morrow, 62 S.W.2d at 645 n.17. However, core judicial
functions, "do not include functions that are generally designed to
'assist' courts, such as conducting fact finding hearings, holding
pretrial conferences, and making recommendations to judges." State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah 1998) (quoting Ohms, 881 P.2d at
851 n.17).
21 In re J.S.P., 278 S.W.3d 414, 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008)
("We
recognize that under our Constitution, once the jurisdiction of the court
has been invoked, it is the trial judge who possesses the judicial power
to hear cases, decide disputed issues of fact and law, enter a judgment
in accordance with the facts and the law, and enforce its judgment once
entered ..... .While we cannot, and do not, condone a wholesale
delegation of judicial authority ... we recognize that there are limited
circumstances ... where delegation of some authority to a third party
may be necessary.. . ."). The court pointed out, however, that the trial

court's ability to delegate is not limitless. Id.; see also, e.g., In re
Donnovan, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (stating
"[a]lthough a court may base its determination of the appropriateness of
visitation on input from therapists, it is the court's duty to make the
actual determination" and holding that an order providing that the

375
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Thus, Parenting Coordination is subject to challenge
as an improper delegation of judicial authority that lacks
legislative authority, because it does not "fit" within the
parameters of familiar extra-judicial roles. The process
varies across the jurisdictions utilizing Parenting
Coordination. Different jurisdictions may delegate different
types of duties to a Parenting Coordinator. 22 In addition,
jurisdictions may tolerate delegations of judicial authority
to varying degrees.23 Thus, a trial court's appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator in any jurisdiction raises the
question of whether the appointment violates the general
principles regarding delegation of judicial authority
applicable in that state. 24 Below, this Article addresses the
father have "no visitation rights without permission of minors'
therapists" was an improper delegation of judicial authority). A court
delegating some authority must nevertheless be more than a reviewing
court. Russell v. Thompson, 619 P.2d 537, 539 (Nev. 1980) (holding,
where the trial court gave the master the authority to find facts and
decide substantially all issues in the case, the trial court's function has
been reduced to that of a reviewing court and thus was an "abdication
b2y a jurist of his constitutional responsibilities and duties").
See infra Part IX and note 155 (Parenting Coordination statutes and
rules in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, North Carolina, and
Oklahoma allow for decision making by the Parenting Coordinator,
while Parenting Coordination statutes and rules of Louisiana, Oregon,
Texas, and Vermont do not allow for decision-making authority).
23 See Coates et al., supra note 3, ("The degree to which [Parenting
Coordination] is seen as a usurpation of the court's inherent decisionmaking authority depends on a jurisdiction's interpretation of applicable
laws and the local legal culture. The more that third-party professionals
(e.g., evaluators, mediators, therapists, special masters, and referees)
are looked to for assessment of a family's situation and relied on for
recommendations as to "best interest" determinations, the more likely
the PC model will be accepted as yet another valuable intervention at
the court's disposal to assist in dispute resolution.").
24 The AFCC Guidelines also recognize that a Parenting Coordinator's
exercise of decision-making authority - by court order or consent could be statutorily or constitutionally impermissible in the given
jurisdiction. AFCC, Guidelines, supra note 8, at 172. ("The scope of
the PC's decision-making authority may be limited in some

376
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issues to be considered in answering that question. The
answer will depend on (1) the source of the trial court's
authority to make the appointment, which is discussed in
Part IV, (2) the benefits to be bestowed by the appointment,
which are discussed in Part V and VI, and (3) whether the
role is properly limited, which is discussed in Parts VII
through X. An appropriate combination of authority and
limitation can withstand an argument that Parenting
Coordination is an improper delegation of judicial
authority.
IV. Problem and Possible Solutions:
Authority to Appoint the Parenting Coordinator

Finding

25
Parenting Coordination is "an ADR activity."
However, it is not mediation and it is not arbitration. It
cannot be understood as anything other than a hybrid role
combing aspects of familiar alternative dispute resolution
processes and adding a dose of education, or counseling.26
Thus, Parenting Coordination does not "fit" within the
parameters of familiar legal processes.27 Thirteen states

jurisdictions by constitutional law or statute. A PC should be
knowledgeable about governing law and procedure in the PC's
jurisdiction regarding decision-making or arbitration by the PC.")
25 Kirkland & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 633.
26 Although a Parenting Coordinator is often a psychologist, "PC is not
therapy." Id. (explaining that Parenting Coordination is distinct from
psychotherapy in many respects). One Parenting Coordinator stated:
"As a PC, I'm a junior judge, not an evaluator or a therapist." Id. at 629
(quoting a Parenting Coordinator who holds a J.D. and a Ph.D.).
Perhaps most significant for the instant purposes is that, in Parenting
Coordination, the focus of the service is on the best interests of the
children and on reorganized family; it is not on any one of the parents
seeing the Parenting Coordinator. See id.
27 Shear, supra note 16(explaining statutory schemes such as
those for
mediation, child custody evaluation, child custody counseling, and
judicial reference have specific and mutually exclusive requirements
and therefore cannot be merged to create the Parenting Coordination
model).

14
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have adopted statutes or court rules permitting Parenting
Coordination, some with and some without decisionmaking authority. 28 At least ten states, however, are
specific
utilizing Parenting Coordination without
authority. 29 Where the Parenting Coordinator's role is

completely dependent on a court order - that is, where
28

Arizona: ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PROC. 74; Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT.

ANN. §§ 14-10-128.1, 128.3 (West 2010); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61-125 (West 2010); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717D (2010);
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l)(3); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:358:1
(2010); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1659 (2009);
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1751 (West 2010); North
Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91 (West 2010); Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.1 (West 2010); Oregon: OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 107.425 (West 2010); Texas: TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
153.605 (Vernon 2009); Vermont: VT. FAM. P.R. 4(s); West Virginia:
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-208 (West 2010).
29 It is difficult to ascertain precisely how many states are using
Parenting Coordination without statutory or rule based authority
because, in a jurisdiction utilizing Parenting Coordination, there may
not be published decisions reflecting the appointment and, even if there
are published decisions reflecting the use of Parenting Coordination,
those decision are not easily identifiable if the decision does not use the
term "Parenting Coordinator." See Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and
Regulations, supra note 8, at 28, regarding inconsistent nomenclature.
However, ten states utilize Parenting Coordination with specific
statutory or rule-based authority authorizing the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator. Alabama: G.R.V. v. M.V., 825 So. 2d 116,
118 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); California: Shear, supra note 16, at 90
(referencing California's then-fourteen years of experimentation with
Parenting Coordination without enabling legislation); Delaware: D.W.
v. R.E., No. CN07-03739, 2009, WL 6303016 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 28,
2009); Illinois: In re C.N., 752 N.E.2d 1030 (Ill. 2001); Indiana:
Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 822 N.E.2d 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004);
Kentucky: Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL
1253473 (Ky. Ct. App. April 2, 2010); Nevada: Pierce v. Ciccarone,
No. 52515, 2008 WL 6124780 (Nev. Dec. 18, 2008); New York: L.S.
v. L.F., 803 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 2005); Pennsylvania: Yates v.
Yates, 963 A.2d 535 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008); Tennessee: Nesbitt v.
Nesbitt, No. M2006-02645-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112538 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 14, 2009).
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there is no statute or rule that provides for its appointment the question is whether the court has the authority to order
the appointment. Can that authority be based on existing
laws permitting a trial court to send a matter to mediation
or arbitration, or to appoint a special master? Can that
authority be based on a trial court's inherent authority?
These questions make Parenting Coordination vulnerable to
challenge as an unauthorized delegation of judicial
authority.
Parenting Coordination borrows aspects of different
extra-judicial devices that trial courts are authorized to
utilize. For example, a Parenting Coordinator assists parties
in an attempt to "mediate" a dispute and, when he makes a
decision, acts similar to an arbitrator or special master.
However, a Parenting Coordinator differs from a mediator,
arbitrator, or a special master in fundamental ways. Thus,
statutes and court rules that authorize a trial court's use of
authorize a trial
those alternative devices do not necessarily
30
Coordination.
Parenting
of
court's use
If a Parenting Coordinator is appointed under a
statute or rule authorizing some other process, the
Parenting Coordinator will and should be expected to
adhere to the procedures prescribed by the authorizing
statute or rule; and if he does not, will be subject to
allegations that he has violated the statute or rule that
served as the ostensible basis for the appointment. 3 At the
30

A leader in the Parenting Coordination movement and an attorney in

Oklahoma, the first state to pass a Parenting Coordination law, noted
that in the process of developing a Parenting Coordination program in
Oklahoma, they realized that they had to have a new law to legally do
what they were trying to do. Without a new law allowing for a
parenting coordinator, a court cannot delegate decision-making
authority to a third party that invades the "high walls of the family."
AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 537.
31Shear, supra note 16, at 92 (explaining that the practice of invoking
laws governing or processes such as mediation as the basis for authority
for Parenting Coordination "opens the door to court challenges on the
grounds of non-compliance with the governing law for each of those
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same time, if the Parenting Coordinator does adhere to the
procedures prescribed by a statute that authorizes mediation
or arbitration, for example, he is not conducting Parenting
Coordination with all of its benefits. 32 Furthermore,
qualifications that are needed in a Parenting Coordinator
differ from qualifications required for other roles such as
mediator, arbitrator, or special master. For these reasons, a
Parenting Coordination appointment should not rest on
statutes authorizing a trial court to utilize other processes
such as mediation, arbitration, or reference to a special
master. Problems in relying on such statutes are examined
more closely below in Parts A, B, and C. In addition, as
discussed in Parts D and E, other potential sources of
authority exist that can support the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator.
A. Statutes and Rules Authorizing Mediation as
Potential Sources of Authority for Parenting Coordination

models"). See, e.g., Heinonen v. Heinonen, 14 P.3d 96, 98-99 (Or. Ct.
App. 2000) (rejecting the idea that the delegation of authority to the
Parenting Coordinator was a permissible form of mediation because the
mediation statute did not authorize a trial court to delegate authority to
a mediator to make a binding ruling "against the wishes of one of the
parties").
32 He also risks accusations of legal and ethical violations due to
confusion about the varying. See Kirkland, PC Lavs, Rules and
Regulations, supra note 8, at 28 ("Inappropriate and inconsistent use
of titles and functions in this arena has been found to be a major risk
for board complaints and civil lawsuits.") (citing Kirkland, et al.,
Quasi-JudicialImmunity for Forensic Mental Health Professionals in
Court-Appointed Roles, 3 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 1 (2006)); see also
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 576 (explaining that the lack of coordination
of review processes creates a "minefield of professional risk" for a
psychologist servicing as a Parenting Coordinator). In addition, if
Parenting Coordination is hastily implemented on an ad hoc basis, the
"brand" of Parenting Coordination is subject to damage, and the
opportunity to reap the benefits to be gained from Parenting
Coordination will be lost. Greenberg, supra note 15, at 209.
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Statutes or rules of court that authorize a trial court
to order mediation should not be construed to also approve
of Parenting Coordination. 33 Of course, where a Parenting
Coordinator has decision-making authority, statutes
authorizing mediation, which do not allow for decisionmaking by a mediator, cannot be the basis for the
authority. 34 Even where a Parenting Coordinator does not
have decision-making authority, a mediation statute is not a
sound basis for authority to appoint a Parenting
Coordinator. 35 The processes of mediation and Parenting
Coordination are fundamentally different. A Parenting
Coordinator's role is similar to that of a mediator in that the
goal is to facilitate the parties' mutual agreement regarding
the resolution of a given dispute. 36 The methods by which
those disputes are resolved are also somewhat similar.
Parties typically communicate ex parte with a mediator in
mediation and with a Parenting Coordinator in Parenting
Coordination in an effort to reach a mutual agreement.
33 Heinonen, 14 P.3d at 98 (rejecting the argument that the delegation

of authority to the Parenting Coordinator was a permissible form of
mediation and recognizing that the statutes contemplated mediation to
resolve parenting time and visitation issues but that they did not
authorize a trial court to delegate authority to a mediator to make a
binding ruling "against the wishes of one of the parties.") (citing OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 765(1) (West 2010). See also Shear, supra note 16,
at 94 (explaining that invoking a mediation statute as the basis for
authority to appoint a Parenting Coordinator is "problematic" because,
among other things, mediation is confidential).
34 Id.
35 id.

AFCC, Guidelines, supra note 9, at 165 ("Parenting coordination is a
child-focused alternative dispute resolution process in which a mental
health or legal professional with mediation training and experience
assists high conflict parents to implement their parenting plan by
facilitating the resolution of their disputes in a timely manner ....").
37 AFCC,Guidelines, supra note 9, at 170-71 (stating in Guideline X
that "[b]ecause parenting coordination is a non-adversarial process
designed to reduce acrimony and settle disputes efficiently, a PC may
engage in ex parte (individual) communications with each of the parties
36

18

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 382
However, the roles are significantly different with regard to
reporting to the court about the results of the process.
Mediation of child custody matters is generally
confidential.3 8 A mediator typically may not report to the
court any information beyond whether the matter was
settled through the mediation process. In contrast,
Parenting Coordination is not confidential; the Parenting
Coordination may file reports with the court or even be
called to testify. 39 Because of these fundamental differences
between mediation and Parenting Coordination, statutes or
rules of court that have authorized a trial court to utilize
mediation cannot be construed to also approve of a
Parenting
of
process
different
fundamentally
Coordination.
B. Statutes or Rules Authorizing Appointment of a
Special Master as Potential Sources of Authority for
Appointing a Parenting Coordinator
To the extent that a Parenting Coordinator does
make recommendations to the court or decisions in the
parties' dispute, his role might be compared to that of a

and/or their attorneys, if specified in writing in the order of
appointment, PC agreement or stipulation").
38 Carrie-Anne Tondo, et al., Mediation Trends: A Survey of the States,
39 FAM. CT. REV. 431, 433 (2001).
39 Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and Regulations, supra note 8, at 42
(explaining that this "reporting back to the court feature" distinguishes
Parenting Coordination from mediation and is the "teeth" that compels
the parties to respect the Parenting Coordination process).
40 Authority for ordering mediation is particularly weak as a source for
ordering Parenting Coordination if the trial court seeks to appoint a
Parenting Coordinator with decision-making authority. Mediators do
See id. ("Unlike mediation, PC includes
not make decisions.
investigative, probative, evaluative, reporting, and decision-making
components designed to help post-divorce couple navigate parenting
disputes.").

382
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special master.4 1 Thus, it is prudent to consider whether a
decision-making Parenting Coordinator could be appointed
under the same authority that allows a court to appoint a
special master.
Most states provide some procedure that allows
courts to appoint special masters to handle certain aspects
of litigation. 42 Twenty-three states have a rule of civil
procedure that nearly mirrors the pre-2003 amended
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53.43 A special master
statute or rule that is modeled after the pre-2003 Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53 would limit the matters that can
be referred to a master. 44 Under Rule 53, in a non-jury case,
such as a divorce action in state court, reference to a special
master may be made only upon a showing that "some
exceptional condition" requires the reference.4 5 Thus, a
child custody or visitation matter is not appropriate to refer
to a special master unless there is a showing of an
"exceptional condition" requiring the reference. Limited
available court time and overloaded dockets do not
constitute "exceptional conditions" warranting referrals of
family court matters to a special master.4 6 Thus, such a rule
Terminology varies among the states; the same role might be called a
"referee" or "commissioner." See Lynn Jokela & David F. Herr,
41

Special Masters in State Court Litigation:An Available and Underused
Case Management Tool, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1299, 1300, 1325
(2005) (chart summarizing each state's form of Rule 53).
42 Id. at 1301-02. Illinois is the only state that does not have any
mechanism governing appointment of special masters. Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
46 See, e.g., Ex parte

Mobayed, 689 So. 2d 890, 892 -93 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997) (refusing to allow routine reference to a special master, noting
that if congestion was an exceptional circumstance to warrant a
reference, "present congestion would make references the rule rather
than the exception," which is contrary to the language of the rule itself
that requires that reference be the exception not the rule) (citing La Buy
v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957)).
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is not likely to provide the rationale for appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator. At least four of the states that have
been identified4 7 as utilizing Parenting Coordination
without specific authority have adopted the pre-2003
version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 as their basis for appointing a
special master; 48 thus, a Parenting Coordinator's
appointment in those jurisdictions (and any jurisdictions
similarly situated) could probably not be based on the
state's special master rule.49
Some states have rules or statutes providing for
special masters that are substantively different from the
pre-2003 federal rule discussed above. 50 Whether
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator can be based on a
court's authority to appoint a special master will depend on
each state's special master authority. California is one state
that has specifically determined whether the appointment of
a Parenting Coordinator may be based on the state's
authority to appoint a special mater, or "referee" as it is
called in California, and decided that it does not.51
In California, the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator is dependent on California's special master
statute. However, California's special master statute allows
47 See supra note 29.
48

Alabama:_ALA. R. Civ. P. 53; Indiana: IND. R. TRIAL. P. 53; Nevada:

NEV. R. Civ. P. 53; Tennessee: TENN. R. Civ. P. 53. See Jokela & Herr,

supra note 41, at 1325 (listing those states as adopting the pre-2003
amended version of the federal rule).
49 Interestingly, in 2003, Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, was amended to allow courts to appoint special masters to
assist with pretrial and post-trial work; adoption of the current version
of Rule 53 might therefore provide some basis for authority for
appointing a Parenting Coordinator to oversee implementation of a
court order. When courts appoint a special master to address pretrial or
post-trial matters, it is usually because the court cannot efficiently
address the matter. Jokela & Herr, supra note 41, at 1301 (citing FED.
R. CIv. P. 53 advisory committee's note to 2003 amendments).
50
Id.
511Id.

at 1322-23.
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reference to a special master in limited circumstances.
Those limitations make Parenting Coordination impossible
without consent of the parties. 52 For example, a Parenting
Coordinator necessarily has to interpret existing court
orders. The California Court of Appeals in Ruisi v. Thieriot
viewed interpretation of existing orders as a question of
law, which cannot be referred to a special master without
consent. 53 Also, appointment of a Parenting Coordinator
contemplates that he will address disputes that are, at the
time of the appointment, unknown. California's special
master statute, however, does not provide authority to refer
unknown future disputes to a special master.54 Thus, the
court determined that, without consent, the role of
Parenting Coordinator, which would interpret a court order
and address future 55
disputes, could not stand without
parties.
the
of
consent
Where a special master rule might provide some
authority for the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator,
he should follow the procedures of that special master rule
that forms the basis for the appointment. 56 However, in
order to bestow all of the benefits of Parenting
Coordination - specifically, the educational and counseling
component - resort to a special master rule may not be
workable.57 The counseling and educational components
52

Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)

(stating that the distinction between reference to a special master with
consent and reference without consent is "carefully preserved in the
statutes in order to comply with the constitutional mandate").
53 Id. ("The trial court has no authority to refer questions of law....
Disputes involving interpretation of the existing custody orders, for
example, may present questions of law.").
54 Id. ("The trial court has no authority to compel a reference of
unknown future disputes.").
55
56 Id.

See generally id.
See In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 821 (Colo. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that the trial court could not combine appointment of
Parenting Coordinator under Colorado's Parenting Coordinator statute,
57
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that are unique to Parenting Coordination necessarily
involve ex parte communications. A rule or statute that
authorizes appointment of a special master may not tolerate
such ex parte communications. 58 Because of that
fundamental difference between the role of a Parenting
Coordinator and that of a special master, the special master
rule or statute is not a well-founded basis for appointment
of a Parenting Coordinator.
C. Statutes or Rules Authorizing Arbitration as
Possible Sources of Authority for Parenting Coordination
When a Parenting Coordinator does have decisionmaking authority, his role is somewhat like an arbitrator in
that he is making a decision. However, statutes or rules of
court that authorize a trial court to order arbitration cannot
necessarily be construed to also approve of Parenting
Coordination. In determining whether an arbitration statute
can form the basis for Parenting Coordination, it is relevant
to consider whether the state allows arbitration of child
custody issues.
Some states that provide for court-ordered
arbitration, generally, nevertheless prohibit arbitration of
child custody and visitation issues. 59 Even parents'
agreements to arbitrate custody have been held invalid. It
which does not allow for decision-making authority, with decision-

making authority of a special master provided for by Colorado's special
master rule).
58 Horton v. Ferrell, 981 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Ark. 1998) (holding that a
special master is a judge subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct and
therefore should disqualify after relying upon ex parte
communications); State ex rel. Hamrick v. Stucky, 640 S.E.2d 243, 249
(W. Va. 2006) (holding that a special master is a pro-tempore part-time
judge and must comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct).
59 See, e.g., Toiberman v. Tisera, 998 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. App. 2008)
(citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.104(14)(West 2011); Pulfer v. Pulfer, 673
N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Glauber v. Glauber, 600
N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (N.Y. 1993).
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has been held that parents can never finally contract with
respect to the custody of their children because the courts
stand in the relation of parens patriae to minor children,
and therefore, must determine questions of custody and
visitation according to the welfare and best interests of the
children. 60 Where a jurisdiction prohibits arbitration of
child custody and visitation issues, the court should tread
lightly in appointing a Parenting Coordinator and look to
other sources of authority to support the appointment.
By agreement of the parties, some courts have
allowed arbitration of child custody and visitation. Where
See, Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 742-43 ("A court cannot be bound by
an agreement as to custody and visitation, or either custody or
visitation, and simultaneously act as parens patriae on behalf of the
child."); Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ohio 2001) (declining to
allow arbitration of child custody issues, which go to the "very core of
the child's welfare and best interests," because that would "encroach
upon the trial court's traditional role as parens patriae"). The court in
Kelm was not convinced by the argument that the opportunity for
judicial review of the arbitration award cured the defect; the court was
of the opinion that the opportunity for de novo judicial review of an
arbitration award destroys the parties' expectation that an arbitration
award will be final, therefore, the court said, it is, is wasteful of time
and duplicative of effort. For that reason, it was not "advantageous to
the best interests of children." Id.
61 See, e.g., Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347, 360 (N.J. 2009) ("The right
60

to parental autonomy subsumes the right to submit issues of child
For us,
custody and parenting time to an arbitrator for disposition ....
the bundle of rights that the notion of parental autonomy sweeps in
includes the right to decide how issues of custody and parenting time
will be resolved. Indeed, we have no hesitation in concluding that, just
as parents 'choose' to decide issues of custody and parenting time
among themselves without court intervention, they may opt to sidestep
the judicial process and submit their dispute to an arbitrator whom they
have chosen.") (quoting E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the "Creaturesof
the State": Contractingfor Child Custody Decision Making in the Best
Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1210 (Fall
2000)). For further discussion regarding the differing views as to
whether to allow arbitration of child custody disputes, see George K.
Walker, ArbitratingFamily Law Cases by Agreement, 18 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 429, 431-33 (2003).
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such precedent exists, a court might more reasonably rely
62
on arbitration authority to order Parenting Coordination.
Nevertheless, there remains the substantive problem with
the differences in the procedures. Ex parte communications
between the parties and the Parenting Coordinator is
troubling when the Parenting Coordinator does have
decision-making authority, as he would under authority to
arbitrate. In that situation, the parties are, in essence,
communicating ex parte with the decision maker. When the
judge is a decision maker and parties communicate with
him ex parte, he must recuse himself.
If a Parenting Coordinator may serve where a judge
could not, any court rule or statute to which a court resorts
for appointment authority should clearly contemplate the
appointment. Moreover, it must make additional provisions
to compensate for the risks inherent in such an
arrangement. Thus, authority for appointment of an
arbitrator to decide an issue regarding child custody and
visitation should not be resorted to as a basis for authority
to appoint a Parenting Coordinator.
D. Trial courts' Equitable or Inherent Powers as
Possible Sources of Authority for Appointing a Parenting
Coordinator
There are some arguments to be made that a trial
court has authority to appoint a Parenting Coordinator
without specific authority provided by a statute or court
rule. In some jurisdictions, a trial court's authority to enter
orders regarding custody and visitation of children is based
on a court's general equity powers. 63 In such jurisdictions,
62 Kentucky, for example, allows arbitration of custody matters,
Masterson v Masterson, 60 S.W. 301 (Ky. App. 1901), and also allows

for Parenting Coordination, see Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473 (Ky. Ct. App. April 2, 2010).

Alabama: Snead v. Davis, 90 So. 2d 825 (Ala. 1956) (stating that a
court of equity awarding custody of children in divorce proceeding is
63
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the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator could be
upheld as allowed under the court's broad inherent equity
powers, acting as parenspatriae in the best interest of the
children. 64 Also, it might be upheld as allowed pursuant to
the trial court's 65inherent authority to enforce its own orders
and judgments.
In some jurisdictions, however, trial court authority
to make determinations about child custody and visitation

exercising its inherent powers); Missouri: Urbanek v. Urbanek, 503
S.W.2d 434, 441 (Mo. App. 1973) ("The right and power to determine
custody and maintenance of children is not born out of statute, but
exists because of the inherent power of courts exercising equitable
jurisdiction to care for and provide for a minor child."); I. v. B., 305
S.W.2d 713, 722 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that, in determining the
custody of a child of divorced parents, the jurisdiction of an equity
court is not limited to the express provisions of a statute, but is broad
enough to accomplish what is necessary to make a correct
determination with respect to the child's custody and welfare); New
Jersey: Henderson v. Henderson, 91 A.2d 747, 750 (N.J. 1952) (stating
that the court has "general equity parens patriae jurisdiction" in child
custody cases, predicated upon minor's residence in State); see Clemens
v. Clemens, 90 A.2d 72, 76-77 (App. Div. 1952) (stating that a statute
granting authority in divorce actions to make orders touching the care,
custody, education, and maintenance of children was not intended to
restrict the court's general jurisdiction over child custody).
64See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 682 So. 2d 1051, 1054 -55 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996) (stating that, under the statute that provides that, in conjunction
with a divorce, a court has "wide discretion" to "make such orders in
respect to the custody of the children as their safety and well-being may
require").
65 See, e.g., Telek, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473
(Ky.
Ct. App. April 2, 2010) (indicating that the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator might be proper under the trial court's inherent authority to
enforce its own orders) (citing Akers v. Stephenson, 469 S.W.2d 704,
706 (Ky. 1970)). But see Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 772
n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting the argument that the court had the
authority to refer the matter to a Parenting Coordinator under the statute
that allows the court to enforce its orders by any such orders as it
determines necessary because the statute does not give the trial court
explicitly authority to direct a reference of family law issues).
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is statutory. 66 Thus, the court has no power to do anything
other than what is conferred upon the court by statute,
perhaps even with consent of the parties. 67 Under that
approach, a Parenting Coordinator probably cannot be
permissibly appointed where no statute specifically allows
it.6 8 The logical extension of this view is that, even an
agreement of the parties to allow a Parenting Coordinator
to make decisions is not allowable, because such
assignment of a judicial role to a non-judicial designee
would be an abridgement of the trial court's statutory
authority to make determinations on69custody and visitation
of a child in the child's best interest.
66

Colorado: In re Marriage of Trouth, 631 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Colo. App.
1981) (relying on a statute granting the court the authority to award
custody to grandparents); Connecticut: Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 362
A.2d 889, 891 (Conn. 1975) (relying on a statute granting the court the
authority to award alimony and support through a pendente lite
hearing); Maine: Roberts v. Roberts, 697 A.2d 62, 64 (Me. 1997)
(stating that "the custody and support of minor children must be found
in the statutes or it does not exist."); Michigan: Merchant v. Merchant,
343 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Mich. App. 1983) (reasoning that the court's
authority during divorce proceedings is "purely statutory."); New
Hampshire: Stetson v. Stetson, 171 A.2d 28, 29 (N.H. 1961) ("[T]he
power of the Superior Court to award custody of minor children and to
make provisions for the support of the wife and the children is wholly
statutory, and ... the court has no independent equity jurisdiction.");
Virginia: Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 261 S.E.2d 52, 54 (Va. 1979) ("The
jurisdiction of a court to provide for child support pursuant to a divorce
is purely statutory.").
67 See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 97 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ohio 1951)
("no
jurisdiction other than that granted by statute can be conferred upon
such a court even with the consent of the parties to an action").
68 Cf Avila v. Leonardo, 128 P.2d 43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942)
(stating that authority of the court in a divorce action to make necessary
orders for the support of the minor children of the marriage is conferred
by statute and its exercise cannot be limited or abridged by the parents).
69 See, e.g., Heinonen v. Heinonen, 14 P.3d 96 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that, because the trial court's authority is purely statutory and
no statute authorizes the trial court to delegate that authority to a
Parenting Coordinator, the trial court could not so delegate because
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Depending on a jurisdiction's view of the authority
of the appointing court - that it can exercise equitable
powers as necessary to ensure the best interest of the child
on the one hand or as constrained by statute on the other Parenting Coordination may be sustainable without a
specific authorizing rule or statute.
E. Other Statutes as Basis for Authority or
Providing Analogous Support for the Authority to Appoint
a Parenting Coordinator
A state might have some other statute or court rule
allowing a third-party judicial designee that could provide
the basis for the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator.
For example, Kentucky does not have a statute specifically
providing for the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator.
However, a court identified as one possible source for the
authority to appoint a Parenting Coordinator a statute that
grants the trial court's authority to order a local child
welfare department, for example, to exercise continuing
custodial or
supervision over the case to assure that the
7°
visitation terms of the decree are carried out.
Similarly, New York has allowed appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator under a court's authority to appoint a
"case manager," although the Parenting Coordinator cannot

delegating that authority would deprive the trial court of its statutorily
mandated authority to determine issues of child custody and visitation
time). But see Polacek v. Polacek, 222 P.3d 732 (Or. Ct. App. 2009)
(allowing delegation of decision-making authority to a Parenting
Coordinator post-Heinonen where the trial court would subsequently
review
that decision).
70
Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473 (Ky.
Ct. App. April 2, 2010). The statute allows such an appointment "[i]f
both parents or all contestants agree to the order, or if the court finds
that in the absence of the order the child's physical health would be
endangered or his emotional development significantly impaired."
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make decisions. 7 1 New Jersey has allowed appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator under the court's authority to
appoint an expert to assist the court in making decisions,
although such a Parenting Coordinator could not make
decisions.72
71

In New York, which does not have a Parenting Coordination statute,

it has been held that allowing a Parenting Coordinator to make
decisions is an improper delegation of judicial authority, but that a
Parenting Coordinator without decision-making authority may be
appointed. Edwards v. Rothschild, 60 A.D.3d 675 (N.Y. 2009) (relying
on cases that have held that it is improper to condition future visitation
on the recommendation of a mental health professional or to allow a
child's treating clinical to decide future custody issues); see also L.S. v.
L.F., 803 N.Y.S.2d 881 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (taking the "unusual
step" of appointing a Parenting Coordinator and granting no decisionmaking authority to the Parenting Coordinator but appointing him to
assist the parties in re-establishing visitation between the child and his
father) (citing Zafran v. Zafran, 761 N.Y.S.2d 317 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003) (holding that it was not an improper delegation of judicial
authority to appoint a "case manager," which has no decision-making
authority)).
72 Lindsley v. Lindsley, No. 2006 WL 157316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Jan. 23, 2006). The husband argued that the use of a Parenting
Coordinator was an impermissible delegation of judicial authority. Id.
at *6. The court decided, however, that the appointment of the
Parenting Coordinator was the appointment of an expert provided for
by New Jersey court rules. Id. The court recognized that a court was not
to abdicate its decision-making role to an expert but held that it was
clear that the trial court did not cede his authority to the expert; instead,
he relied on the expert's report and had carefully defined the expert's
role and preserved the court's role as the ultimate decision-maker in the
case. Id. at *7. The trial judge had said:
the [Parenting Coordinator] will offer you a
recommendation, not a decision. And you can agree
with it, resolve it, it's done. Or one of you can say,
we didn't like that, we're going to the judge .... I'm
not abdicating my decision-making authority to that
person, but I'm giving him an opportunity to funnel
through your dispute as parents without involving
me, who wears this black dress.
Id. at *1.
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Not all courts agree, of course, that a statute other
than a Parenting Coordinator statute can allow for the
appointment. 73 Moreover, where another statute is relied
upon as the basis for the appointment, the Parenting
Coordinator should adhere to the procedures and
requirements of that statute, which may not be consistent
with the goals and procedures of Parenting Coordination.74
A more sound approach might be that taken by the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which determined that
allowing a Parenting Coordinator to make decisions about
issues that are "ancillary" to the trial court's order was not
an improper delegation of judicial authority.75 Although
73 Heinonen v. Heinonen, 14 P.3d 96 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). The court in

Heinonen recognized the statutory authority for the trial court to use
services of a psychologist or a mental health expert to evaluate
parenting time requests, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.425 (West 2010),
and to modify parenting time provisions by stipulation subject to the
court discretion to hold a hearing, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.174
(West 2010), and that the statutes provide for an expedited procedure to
resolve disputes, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.425 (West 2010). 14 P.3d

at 98-99. However, the court rejected any idea that what the trial court
had
74 done in Heinonen fell within the ambit of any of those statutes. Id.
See supra Parts IV.A., B., and C.
75 Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). The
Pennsylvania Superior Court also noted that at least one Pennsylvania
County had adopted local rules authorizing appointing of a Parenting
Coordinator and setting out the role of a Parenting Coordinator. It also
noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Domestic Relationships
Procedural Rules Committee was considering a proposed Rule of Civil
Procedure and a model order to unify parenting coordination
procedures across the statute of Pennsylvania. Id. at 539 n.2. Yates has
been cited by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals as instructive in
that court's decision that a trial court's delegation of authority to a third
party to oversee family therapy was not improper. Meyr v. Meyr, 7
A.3d 125, 139-140 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). Because the trial court
had resolved the primary issues regarding custody and visitation and
the third-party's role involved "merely the coordination of family
therapy," which the court viewed as "ancillary" to custody and
visitation, it determined that the trial court had not improperly
delegated its judicial authority. Id.
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authority for the appointment of a special master and a
hearing officer did not provide the authority for the
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator, those provisions
for the "limited" delegation of
were at least precedent
76
authority.
judicial
As the Pennsylvania court recognized, the
delegation of authority to a Parenting Coordinator is a
"limited" delegation, and there is undoubtedly precedent in
any jurisdiction for some limited delegation of some tasks
related to a judge's disposition of his duties. That rationale
- that the role of a Parenting Coordinator is limited and
there is analogous authority for a limitation delegation of
judicial authority - combined with the idea that the court
does have some parenspatriae authority to protect the best
interest of the children and to enforce its own orders,
provides a valid argument that Parenting Coordination is
sustainable without a specific statute or court rule
authorizing the appointment. 77 Where a trial court has some
inherent authority to ensure the best interest of the children,
with or without specific statute or rule-based authority,
Parenting Coordination can be sustained. Combined with
the substantial benefits of a qualified Parenting
Coordinator, imposing appropriate limitations on the
Parenting Coordinator's role can incrementally diminish
the argument that appointment is an improper delegation of
76

Yates, 963 A.2d at 541.

It might be argued that the role is narrow enough that the Parenting
Coordinator's role is merely ministerial and not judicial. In deciding
whether an improper judicial delegation has occurred in different
contexts, courts have focused on whether the action delegated involved
a "judicial function" or the "ultimate decision-making authority," or
involved merely ministerial matters or "details." See, e.g., United States
v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the delegation
of the details of court-ordered therapy, including choosing a provider
and schedule, was permissible); United States v. Grant, 52 F.3d 448,
451 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial judge did not delegate a
judicial function by directing the jury to tell the reporter to go faster or
slower as the jury listened to testimony read-backs).
77
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judicial authority. Achieving an appropriate balance of
benefits and limitations is discussed in light of the basis for
appointment authority, which achieves a sustainable
appointment. The benefits and limitations are discussed in
the remainder of this Article.
V. The Benefits of Parenting Coordination in HighConflict Cases
Unlike a judgment in almost every other kind of
litigation, a divorce judgment is written at a specific point
in time and attempts to address the relationship of the
parties at that specific point in time and in the future.
78
However, that relationship is not static; it changes.
Ideally, a parenting plan would specify in detail the terms
governing the post-divorce relationship, such as the
visitation schedule, so as to avoid opportunities for frequent
conflict. However, often times a parenting plan is not
sufficiently specific, thus allowing for frequent
opportunities

for conflict. 79 Furthermore, for divorced

couples who have not developed the ability to resolve
78

Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299, 304 (Ohio 2001) ("[A]s a practical

matter, a custody and visitation order is never absolutely final.").
79 Linda D. Elrod, A Minnesota Comparative Family Law Symposium:
Reforming the System to Protect Children in High Conflict Custody
Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 495, 529-30 (2001) ("Highly
structured parenting plans that help parents disengage may be valuable
tools to deal with high-conflict parents. A lengthy and detailed
parenting plan gives less room for each parent to manipulate or feel the
other parent is manipulating them."). It has been suggested that a
Parenting Coordinator assist in the process of drafting such a detailed
parenting plan. See, e.g., Cassandra Brown, Ameliorating the Effects of
Divorce on Children, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 461, 478 (2009)
(suggesting that a Parenting Coordinator could add "increased structure
and detail in the parenting plan") (citing Coates et al., supra note 3, at
249-250). Such a role, however, is not consistent with the typical
Parenting Coordinator's role which arises after a court order is entered.
See infra Part VII.
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conflict between them, even a parenting plan with intricate
details cannot eliminate all possibility of conflict. Even the
most detailed parenting plan cannot contemplate every
situation that will arise: children's ages, interests and
activities change over time, and parents may remarry and
relocate. A parenting plan that appeared to contemplate and
address every opportunity for conflict when the children
were three and five years old will not necessarily
contemplate and resolve every conflict that will arise when
those same children are thirteen and fifteen years old.
Parenting Coordination is intended for high-conflict
divorced parents - those who otherwise would repeatedly
be in court seeking intervention in their daily lives. If the
divorced parents do not have the ability to resolve the
conflicts that arise during that period, they will frequently
be back in court. These high-conflict parents use a
amount of the court's time and
disproportionate
80
resources.
While Parenting Coordinators address what may be
81
perceived as minor conflicts between the parents,
depending on whether and how these conflicts are resolved,
80 Coates et al., supra note 3, at 246-47; see also Wilma J. Henry et al.,
ParentingCoordinationand Court Relitigation:A Case Study, 47 FAM.
CT. REV. 682, 682-83 (October 2009) (stating that family courts and
associated professionals spend approximately 90 percent of their time
on about 10 percent of parents).
81 Coates et al., supra note 3, at 247 (noting that disputes between highconflict parents are often minor, involving such things as one-time
changes in a visitation schedule, telephone access, and vacation
planning). See also infra Part VII, discussing that, properly utilized,
Parenting Coordinator will encompass only assisting the parties in
implementing a well-drafted, detailed parenting plan that has been
incorporated into a court order and will, thus, address only minor
issues. Parenting Coordinators should be involved when the rights at
stake are relatively insignificant in comparison to a right such as the
right to custody or visitation in toto. If Parenting Coordinators are
being used in a different capacity the balance maybe tipped against
granting decision-making authority to the Parenting Coordinator.
However, such is not the proper role of a Parenting Coordinator.
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the conflicts can have a major impact on the children of
those parents. The level and intensity of the parental
conflict prior, during, and after divorce proceedings, rather
than the divorce itself, is thought to be the most dominant
factor in a child's psychological and social adjustment postdivorce. 82 Exposure to conflict can result in problems such
as perpetual emotional turmoil, depression, substance
abuse, and educational failure. 83 Thus, it is imperative to
avoid even those conflicts regarding minor issues, and
implement mechanisms of resolving those conflicts
amenably. However, the typical mechanism for resolving
conflict - the adversarial process of our court8 4 system encourages combat and discourages cooperation.
82

See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 79, at 497; see generally John H. Grych,

Interparental Conflict as a Risk Factor for Child Maladjustment:
Implicationsfor the Development of PreventionPrograms,43 FAM. CT.
REv. 97, 99 (2005).
83 Elrod, supra note 79; see generally Grych, supra note
82.
84
See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for
Parents and Children in Custody and Access Disputes: Current
Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129, 131 (2002) ("It
has long been noted that the adversarial divorce process exacerbates
the conditions that create risk for children, and often undermines
parental efforts to maintain protective conditions for children after
separation.") (citing JANET R. JOHNSTON & LINDA G. CAMPBELL,
IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY
CONFLICT 38-44 (1988)). Kelly explains the failings of the adversarial

process:
The central failings of the adversarial process with
respect to custody disputes are the inherent
mechanisms and practices that escalate conflict,
diminish the possibility of civility between parents,
exacerbate the win-lose atmosphere that encourages
bitterness and parental irresponsibility, and weaken
important parent-child relationships. The basic nature
of the adversarial process pits parents against each
other, encourages polarized and positional thinking
about each other's deficiencies, and discourages
parental communication, cooperation, and more
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In response to the detrimental effects of the
adversarial process and parental conflict, multiple means of
alternative dispute resolution have developed, such as
mediation and arbitration of child custody cases. Parenting
Coordination, however, is different from other alternative
means of dispute resolution; it looks to the future beyond
the instant conflict. 85 In addition to addressing the instant
conflict between the parents, Parenting Coordination
further seeks to avoid future conflict. Parenting
Coordination sets out to teach the parents to make
decisions and resolve conflicts among themselves.86 This
"teaching" 87 component of Parenting Coordination
separates Parenting Coordination from other alternative
dispute resolution processes. It provides benefits that other
alternative dispute resolution processes do not to the court

mature thinking about children's needs at a critical
time of change and upheaval. Possible future
constructive relationships between parents are often
thus destroyed.
Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions, 10 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. at 131.

85 Other differences between Parenting Coordination and familiar
alternative dispute resolution processes are discussed further in Parts
IV.A, B., and C above.

Kirkland, Positive Coping, supra note 15, at 62 ("Parenting
coordinators attempt to teach divorced parents how to function
independently of the court to resolve conflicts and implement their own
parenting plans."); Shear, supra note 16, at 90 (explaining that
Parenting Coordination incorporates elements of "parent education and
coaching, mediation, arbitration, judicial reference and child custody
evaluation"); Greenberg, supra note 15, at 208 (cleverly using in this
context the Chinese proverb: "Give a man a fish and he will eat for a
day. But, teach him to fish, he will eat for a lifetime.").
87 In interviews with Parenting Coordinators in North Carolina, most
Parenting Coordinators agreed that their primary issue is making clear
to the parents the effect that their ongoing conflict would have on the
children. Sherrill W. Hayes, "More of a Street Cop than a Detective":
an Analysis of the Roles and Functions of Parenting Coordinators in
86

North Carolina,48 FAM. CT. REV. 698, 702 (October 2010).
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system, the children of divorce, and the high-conflict
parents.
Parenting Coordination also provides a benefit to
the court system. With the proper utilization of Parenting
Coordination, the court system does not become what it
otherwise would - a type of social service agency."8 In the
short term, the Parenting Coordinator will assist the parties
in mutually resolving a given conflict, or making a decision
that will resolve the instant conflict. Thus, the parties will
not appear before the court for the given conflict.
Secondly, there are longer-term benefits to
Parenting Coordination. Ideally, throughout the course of
working with the Parenting Coordinator, the parents will
develop the skills and abilities to resolve conflicts on their
own. This in turn reduces the need to resort to the judiciary
- or even a Parenting Coordinator - when future conflicts
arise. A study on the effectiveness of Parenting
Coordination determined that, after the appointment of
Parenting Coordinators in high-conflict cases, there was a
"near 25-fold" decrease in court appearances in those
cases. 89 A more recent study indicated a reduction of
88

See Dana E. Prescott, When Co-Parenting Falters: Parenting

Coordinators, Parents-in-Conflict, and the Delegation of Judicial

Authority, 20 ME. B.J. 240, 243 (2005) (stating that because "courts
will continue to be the vessel into which all this chaos is poured,"
"courts will evolve as more of a social service agency th[a]n a separate
constitutional branch of government charged with the issuance of
judgments within the traditional boundaries of the law").
89 Psychologist and Parenting Coordinator, Terry Johnston, Ph.D.,
analyzed 166 cases over a two-year period. AFCC, Implementation
Issues, supra note 3, at 534 (citing Johnston, T., Cost Effectiveness of
Special Master Use, unpublished report, 1994). In the year before
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator, those 166 cases had 993 court
appearances among them, an average of six court appearances per case.
Id. In contrast, in the year after appointment, those cases had only
thirty-seven court appearances among them, an average of .22 court
appearances per case. Id.; see also Elizabeth Kruse, ADR, Technology,
and New Court Rules - Family Law Trends for the Twenty-First
Century, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW, 207, 217 (2008) (citing
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approximately seventy-five percent of child-related court
filings after Parenting Coordination was implemented. 90
Parenting Coordination also benefits the children of
divorced parents. The use of a Parenting Coordinator can
allow for a more harmonious - or at least a less hostile -

environment for the children. If parents proceed to deal
with conflicts on their own by hiring their own attorneys
and resolving disputes in the adversarial system, it becomes
unlikely that they will develop the skills and abilities to
resolve the conflict on their own. In the meantime, that
litigious environment in the respective households is not in
the best interest of the children; it is in the best interest of
to be able to amicably resolve
the children for their parents
91
arise.
they
as
conflicts
Parenting Coordination also benefits high-conflict
parents. As a purely practical matter, when small postdivorce conflicts arise between parents, the parents need a
speedy resolution. They often cannot get in front of the
court soon enough to meaningfully resolve the conflict. A
Parenting Coordinator is much more easily accessible than
a judge. A Parenting Coordinator can help the parties to
make decisions expeditiously or quickly make a decision
when the parties are unable to do so.92 For example, assume
Johnston's study as evidence that Parenting Coordination is an effective
tool for reducing repeat litigation among parents).
90

Henry et al., supra note 80, at 682.

9'See discussion infra Part V regarding the detrimental effects on
children of post-divorce conflict. At least some courts take the same
view. See, e.g., Cichocki v. Mazurek-Smith, 8 Pa. D. & C. 5th 361, 377
(2009) ("Hopefully, the [Parenting Coordinator] will be able to
facilitate the interaction of the parties. Beyond that, this court believes
that co-parenting counseling is imperative. The parties need to begin to
understand the other's point of view, which will hopefully soften their
stance against each other and benefit the minor child.") (footnote
omitted).
92 Shear, supra note 16, at 91 (parents using Parenting Coordination
"trade off one set of risks and benefits for another - giving up formal
rights and guarantees of fair play and accountability for informality,
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that a parenting plan prescribes that the father shall have
visitation with the children on alternating weekends. The
same parenting plan also provides that the mother shall
have the children on Mother's Day weekend. The parenting
plan, however, does not address what will happen when
there is a conflict between alternating weekend visitation
and Mother's Day weekend visitations. Four weeks from
Mother's Day weekend, the parents realize there is a
conflict and are unable to resolve it. The likelihood of
presenting the issue to the court before Mother's Day is
slim. However, the Parenting Coordinator is available
much sooner. 93 Ideally, he can help the parties reach a
mutual decision. If not, he may 94 be able to make a
decision. Either way, the matter is resolved in a timely
manner. The parents also benefit from the process in that
the Parenting Coordinator can equip them with the ability
to resolve future conflicts on their own.
Ideally, the Parenting Coordination process will
also be less expensive for the parents than resolving their
disputes in the adversarial system by hiring an attorney. If
parents seek to resolve their dispute in the adversarial
environment of the court, they would each be paying their
own attorneys. Furthermore, by using the adversarial
system rather than a Parenting Coordinator, they would be
more likely to return to court again and again, paying their
lawyers again and again. 95 Of course, where the Parenting
quick decisions, and a decision-maker who has substantial experience
in child custody issues, and incremental decision-making").
93 See Hayes, supra note 87, at 699 (one of the three major roles
identified in interviews with Parenting Coordinators in North Carolina
was resolving issues in a timely manner).
94 Whether the Parenting Coordinator has decision-making authority
depends upon the terms of the appointment and any governing
Parenting Coordination statute or court rule in the jurisdiction.
95 See supra note 89 (discussing study that showed that parents using
Parenting Coordination returned to court an average of only .22 times a
year, as compared to six times a year without use of Parenting
Coordination).
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Coordinator does not have decision-making authority but is
simply a "hoop" through which the parties must jump
before getting before the court, 96 with their lawyers in tow,
this does not hold true.
Thus, some of the practical benefits of Parenting
Coordination are eroded if the Parenting Coordinator does
not have decision-making authority. Consider the above
hypothetical. If the Parenting Coordinator does not have
decision-making authority and the parties are unable to
reach a mutual decision about who has the children on
Mother's Day weekend, the parties will have to resort to
court. Thus, (1) the court is left to resolve the conflict; (2)
more time has passed, making it even less likely that the
parties will get before the court in time for the court to
meaningfully resolve the conflict; (3) the children have
possibly been exposed to conflict; (4) the parties' acrimony
has increased; and (5) their expenses have been duplicated.
There are, nevertheless, some benefits of Parenting
Coordination even when the Parenting Coordinator does
not have decision-making authority. Merely recommending
solutions when the parties encounter conflict will help the
parties resolve the immediate problem. Furthermore, it will
help the parties to develop guidelines and strategies that
97
will help them to avoid similar problems in the future 98
and further to develop strategies to avoid future conflict.
However, the substantive benefits that justify Parenting
96

This is the result if the Parenting Coordinator does not have decision-

making authority; thus, this Article recommends Parenting
Coordination with decision-making authority.
97 In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 821 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008)
(discussing the provision of Colorado's code that allows for
appointment but does not provide the Parenting Coordinator with
decision-making authority and noting that having a Parenting
Coordinator merely assisting the parties in resolving current and future
conflict was the legislative intent in passing the Parenting Coordination
statute).
98 Id.
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Coordination are even greater when the Parenting
Coordinator has decision-making authority.99
VI. Parenting Coordination Qualifications: Vital to
Benefit Realization
As discussed in Part V above, one of the primary
benefits of Parenting Coordination is that it provides highconflict parents with the skills to avoid or resolve future
conflicts on their own. Thus, for Parenting Coordination to
bestow its full benefits on its intended beneficiaries, the
Parenting Coordinator must be qualified to equip the
parents with those skills. Without a qualified Parenting
Coordinator, the benefits of Parenting Coordination erode.
Parenting
Coordination is a "legal-psychological
hybrid."00 Thus, a Parenting Coordinator must have
adequate training in both areas.
The AFCC Task Force on Parenting Coordination
requires that a Parenting Coordinator have "training and
experience in family mediation" and that the Parenting
Coordinator be certified as a mediator in his jurisdiction if
certification is available.' 0 ' In addition, the Parenting
Coordinator shall be either (1) a licensed mental health
professional, (2) a legal professional in an area relating to
families, or (3) a certified family mediator under the rules
or laws of the jurisdiction with a master's degree in a
mental health field. 102 Furthermore, the Parenting
99 Shear, supra note 16, at 90 n.4 (stating that, although the AFCC

Guidelines treat decision-making authority as an optional component of
Parenting Coordination, California's family court community, who has
experimented with Parenting Coordination for more than a decade, has
seen Parenting Coordination decision-making authority as "essential to

deterring re-litigation").
100 Kirkland & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 633; Sullivan, supra note 2, at
576.
'0' AFCC, Guidelinessupra note 9, at 166.
102 id.
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Coordinator should have "extensive practical experience in
the profession with high conflict or litigating parents" and
"training in the parenting coordination process, family
dynamics in separation and divorce, parenting coordination
and
techniques, domestic violence and child maltreatment,
0 3
court specific parenting coordination procedures."'
Parenting Coordination has been described as
"practicing at the interface of the legal/psychological
fields."' 0 4 Without requirements that a Parenting
Coordinator have the education, training, and skills to
practice at this interface, the benefits of Parenting
Coordination erode. Where the benefits that can be
bestowed by a properly qualified Parenting Coordinator are
eroded, so does the justification for allowing such a third
party to intrude into the family in conjunction with their
family court litigation. Yet05 the qualifications required by
various jurisdictions vary. 1
The delegation of judicial authority is a "serious
issue" and the courts should therefore delegate its authority
- to the degree permissible - only to qualified
professionals.' 0 6 Any rationale for Parenting Coordination
offered in this Article deteriorates if the Parenting
Coordinator appointed is not adequately qualified: the
103

The AFCC Guidelines also provide that the Parenting Coordinator

shall "acquire and maintain professional competence in the parenting
coordination process" by regularly participating in educational
activities promoting professional growth. Id.Rather idealistically, the
Guidelines provide that a Parenting Coordinator "shall decline an
appointment, withdraw, or request appropriate assistance when the
facts and circumstances of the case are beyond the Parenting
Coordinator's skill or expertise." Id.
104 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 581.
105AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 552 ("some require[]
possession of a social science or mental health degree; others provide[]
that paraprofessionals, such as a court staff, could fulfill the function
provided adequate training was had;" "[i]n many jurisdictions,
attorneys serve as PCs").
106AFCC, Guidelines, supranote 9, at 165.
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teaching (or counseling) component of Parenting
Coordination is what tips the balance in favor of Parenting
Coordination, because that teaching (or counseling)
component is what broadcasts the benefits of Parenting
Coordination into the future. That component is also what
the judges, mediators, arbitrators, and special masters
cannot provide. The Parenting Coordinator's ability to
provide benefits are a significant part of the equation:
benefits of Parenting Coordination combined with
limitations on Parenting Coordination overcome the
arguments against Parenting Coordination considered in
this Article.
VII. Limitation on Parenting Coordination: Stage of
Divorce Litigation
May a Parenting Coordinator be appointed (1)
immediately upon the commencement of a divorce
proceeding, (2) after a court has entered a pendente lite
order establishing visitation during the pendency of the
divorce proceeding, or (3) only after a court has entered a
judgment of divorce that includes a final custody
determination and a parenting plan? When a parent, postdivorce, petitions the court for modification of the
previously-entered parenting plan, may a court immediately
appoint a Parenting Coordinator, appoint a Parenting
Coordinator after entering a pendent lite order on the
modification petition, or appoint a Parenting Coordinator
only after the court has entered a judgment on the
modification petition? Limiting the appointment to only
after the trial court has entered an order, and thus limiting
the Parenting Coordinator's role to implementing the preexisting court order, weakens arguments that Parenting
Coordination is an improper delegation of judicial
authority.
The AFCC Task Force's Guidelines indicate that
Parenting Coordination is proper only when there is already
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a parenting plan or court-ordered custody and visitation
arrangement in place.' 0 7 Parenting Coordination should be
limited to addressing compliance with an already-existing
court order. Where conflicts arise, the Parenting
Coordinator should first assist the parties in reaching an
agreement and, if they cannot, make a decision that is
consistent with the already-existing court order.'0 8 Thus,
the Parenting Coordinator is not truly free to take
independent action that might be strictly within the
province of the judiciary; instead, he is bound by the terms
of the order that the court has already entered and assists
the parties in their attempt to comply with the court
order. 1°9 For those reasons, appropriately timing the
Parenting Coordinator's appointment strips a layer from the
argument that Parenting Coordination is an improper
delegation of judicial authority.
Many states do not allow Parenting Coordination
until a court has already entered an order to guide the
Parenting Coordinator in his mission. In Oklahoma, which
has operated under enabling legislation longer than any
other state, the Parenting Coordination Act contemplates
The Task Force defines Parenting Coordination as assisting "highconflict parents to implement their parenting plan... ." AFCC,
Guidelines, supra note 9, at 165. It describes the objective of Parenting
Coordination as to "assist high-conflict parents to implement their
parenting plan, to monitor compliance with the details of the plan, to
resolve conflicts regarding their children and the parenting plan in a
timely manner, and to protect and sustain safe, health and meaningful
parent-child relationships." Id.
108 Id. at 171 (Guideline XI, stating that "A PC should attempt to
facilitate agreement between the parties in a timely manner on all
disputes regarding their children as they arise. When parents are unable
to reach agreement, and if it has been ordered by the court, or
authorized by consent, the PC shall decide the disputed issues.").
109 Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473 *5
(Ky. Ct. App. April 2, 2010) (holding that Parenting Coordination was
not an improper delegation of judicial authority because, among other
reasons, the trial court was "simply supervising the court's orders" to
ensure that the terms of its orders are carried out.).
107
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that a Parenting Coordinator will be appointed only after a
court order is in place - either pendente lite or final - and
that the Parenting Coordinator will assist in implementation
of that already-existing order or judgment." 0 Specifically,
the Act limits a Parenting Coordinator's authority to
"matters that aid the parties in," among other things,
"complying with the court's order of custody, visitation, or
guardianship.""' Given that the Parenting Coordinator's
decision-making authority is limited to those things that
will aid the parties in complying with orders that are
already entered, the statute does not indicate that a
Parenting Coordinator has a role when no orders have been
112
entered.

10 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3 (West 2010).
1

112

Id
A pioneer of the Parenting Coordinator movement in Oklahoma

seems to interpret the statute differently but nevertheless concludes that
best practice would be to have a parenting plan in place before a
Parenting Coordinator is appointed. See Barbara Ann Bartlett,
Parenting Coordination: A New Tool for Assisting High-Conflict
Families, 15 OKLA. B. J. 453, 454 (2004) (available at
http://www.okbar.org/obj/articles_04/021404.htm).
This
author,
however, contends that it is not only "best practice," but necessary
under the statutory scheme. Consistent with that interpretation of the
statute, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has stated that the "plain
language of the Act clearly limits the power and authority of a PC to
'aid' in the 'enforcement of the court's order of custody."' Fultz v.
Smith, 97 P.3d 651, 654 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004). Although the court
did not specifically state that the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator cannot be made before the trial court has entered an order,
it reveals that such an appointment is not workable. If the Parenting
Coordinator's authority is limited to "aid" in enforcement of the court's
order, what decisions is the Parenting Coordinator to make in a
situation where no order exists? Even in a modification proceeding
where some order has been entered - the judgment of the initial divorce
proceeding, such as in Fultz, the trial court's appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator is pointless if his role is limited to "aiding" in
the enforcement of a court order because the focus of that litigation is
modify that very order.

44

7.2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 408
The Colorado Parenting Coordinator statute more
specifically indicates that a Parenting Coordinator's
appointment is proper only after the trial court has entered
an order." 3 It provides that a court may appoint a Parenting
Coordinator "at any time after the entry of an order
concerning parental responsibilities and upon notice to the
parties."1 4 Idaho, 11 5 Louisiana, 1 6 and Vermont 1 7 likewise
allow the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator only after
the court has entered an order establishing custody.
Some states do allow appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator prior to the court entering an order. For
example, Florida allows appoints a Parenting Coordinator

113

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010) (stating that "at

any time after the entry of an order concerning parental responsibilities
and upon notice to the parties, the court may ... appoint a parenting
coordinator ....

") (emphasis added); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-

128.3 (West 2010) (stating that, in addition to the appointment of a
parenting coordinator, a court may "at any time after the entry of an
order concerning parental responsibilities ... the court may appoint a
") (emphasis added).
qualified domestic relations decision-maker ..
See also AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 540 ("PCs are
generally used in Colorado in post-decree high conflict parenting
situations where communication has been difficult and litigation
ongoing.").
114 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010).
115 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l)(3) ("The appointment may be made at any
stage in the proceeding after entry of an order, decree, or judgment
establishing child custody.") (emphasis added).
116 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:358:1(A) (2010) ("[Tlhe court may
appoint a parenting coordinator in a child custody case for good cause
shown if the court has previously entered a judgment establishingchild
custody, other than an ex parte order.") (emphasis added). The purpose
of the limitation is to "prevent the court from using the parenting
coordinator process as a means of abdicating its responsibility o make
the initial custody determination." Griffith v. Latiolais, 32 So. 3d 380,
398 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing comments to the statute).
".. V.R.F.P. 4(s) (allowing a court to appoint a Parenting Coordinator
"[i]n an action under this rule in which parental rights and
responsibilities have been adjudicated") (emphasis added).
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"where an order is sought or entered." ' 1 8 Florida allows the
Parenting Coordinator to assist the parties in creating and
implementing the parenting plan." 9 Oregon also appears to
allow appointment prior to entry of a court order by
allowing a Parenting Coordinator to assist the parties in
creating and implementing a parenting plan. 12 Arizona's
rule is the same. 121 North Carolina only permits the
appointment before an order has been entered with consent
of the parties;122 without the parties consent, a Parenting
Coordinator can be appointed only after a custody order or
parenting plan has been entered. 123 In California, which has
operated without any enabling legislation for over sixteen
years,' 24 although the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator typically occurs after a parenting plan has been
put in place, it has been reported that Parenting
Coordinators are sometimes appointed to manage the case
during its pendency, due to the lengthy period of time
1 25
required to reach a court decision in high-conflict cases.
118

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-125 (West 2010).

"9 Id; see also supra note 86 referring to Parenting Coordinators
assisting in drafting of parenting plans.
120 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.425(3)(a) (West 2010).
121ARIz. R. FAM. L. PROC. 74(G) (allowing appointment "[pirior to,
simultaneously with, or after entry of a decree, judgment or custody or
parenting time order").
122N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91 (West 2010) ("The court may
appoint a parenting coordinator at any time during the proceedings of a
child custody action involving minor children ... if allparties consent
to the appointment.") (emphasis added).
123 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91 (West 2010) ("The court
may
appoint a parenting coordinator without the consent of the parties upon
entry of a custody order other than an ex parte order, or upon entry of
a parenting plan only if the court also makes specific findings ....")
(emphasis added). See infra Part VIII for a discussion of the findings a
court must make to appoint a Parenting Coordinator without consent.
124Shear, supra note 16, at 90.
125 AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at
540. A child custody
evaluator is sometimes appointed along with the Parenting Coordinator.
See also Lindsley v. Lindsley, 2006 WL 157316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
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Although some jurisdictions allow for appointment
prior to the entry of a court order, in its typical form,
Parenting Coordination comes after the trial court has
entered an order and a Parenting Coordinator assists the
parties in complying with and implementing the parenting
plan. 126 Significantly, confining the appointment to that
point in time - only after the trial court has entered an order
- and limiting the Parenting Coordinator's role to
implementing the pre-existing court order, while
counseling and educating along the way, allows Parenting
Coordination to address the problems that it was created to
remedy and protects against arguments that Parenting
Coordination is an delegation of judicial authority.' Thus,
the appointment is more likely to be sustained if the
appointment is made after the entry of a trial court's order.
VIII. Limitations on Parenting
Conditions Precedent to Appointment

Coordination:

The conditions precedent to appointment are
relevant in considering whether the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator is an improper delegation of judicial
authority. Relevant conditions precedent to be discussed
Div. Jan. 23, 2006), referring to the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator whose role came into play before the parties were divorced
and who worked with the parties to facilitate settlement of their divorce
and made a report to the court on which the court relied to make its
custody determination.
126 See AFCC's definition of Parenting Coordinator, supra
note 8; see
also Hayes, supra note 87, at 699 (two of the three major roles
identified in interviews with Parenting Coordinators in North Carolina
were implementation of the existing plan and compliance with the
existing plan).
127 While having someone assist the parties during the litigation work
through their disagreements and assist the parties in drafting a mutually
acceptable and detailed parenting plan certainly has value, that is not
Parenting Coordination in its classic form, see id, and, thus, is not the
"Parenting Coordination" that this Article addresses.
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here are consent to the appointment and trial court
findings. 28 Where the parties consent to the appointment,
their later grounds for objection to the appointment is not
well-founded. 129 Even where parties do not consent to the
appointment, if the trial court has made specific findings to
justify the appointment - such as a finding that the parents
are in high conflict or that the appointment of the Parenting
Coordinator is in the best interest of the children - the
additional "intrusion" into the family by appointment of the
Parenting Coordinator may be justified.
The Guidelines of the AFCC Task Force on
Parenting Coordination require that a Parenting
Coordinator serve only by court order or with consent of
the parties. 130 The Guidelines indicate that appointment is
proper when the parents are "high conflict."' 13' Although
the Guidelines do not specifically define "high conflict,"
they describe the Parenting Coordinator's role as "most
frequently reserved for those high-conflict parents who
have demonstrated their longer-term inability or
128

Some states make ability to pay a statutory condition precedent to

the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 120.5 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91(b)
(West 2010). The requirement that only children of parents with the
ability to pay are to benefit from Parenting Coordination weakens the
argument that part of the justification for a Parenting Coordinator's
"intrusion" into the family is the state's obligation to ensure the best
interest of the children, see supra Part IV.D. Some states also consider
evidence of domestic violence in determining whether Parenting
Coordination is appropriate. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10128.1(2)(b) (West 2010), and In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815,
819 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008) (indicating that evidence of domestic
violence could render Parenting Coordination inappropriate) with
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l) (indicating that evidence of domestic violence,
as well as mental illness of chemical dependence, make Parenting
Coordination a viable option).
129 It may be, however, in a jurisdiction that prohibits
arbitration of
child custody matters. See discussion at Part IV.C.
130 AFCC, Guidelines, supra note 9, at 169.
'3' id. at 165.
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unwillingness to make parenting decision on their own, to
comply with parenting agreements or orders, to reduce their
child-related conflicts, and to protect their children from
the impact of that conflict.' ' 132 Most Parenting Coordination
statutes are substantively in line with the recommendations
of the AFCC, requiring either consent or trial court findings
as precedent to an appointment.
Typically, a Parenting Coordinator may be
appointed where both parents consent to such appointment.
In all states with a Parenting Coordination statute, a court
may appoint a Parenting Coordinator even without the
consent of both parties. However, in all but one1 33 the
court must first make some specific findings that warrant
the appointment of the Parenting Coordinator. The findings
required vary among the states. However, they are similar
in that they all contemplate appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator when, contrary to the best interests of the
children involved, those children will be exposed to
persistent post-divorce parental conflict without the
appointment. Allowing the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator only in those circumstances and when the
132

d.

Florida is the exception. Florida's Parenting Coordination statute is
significantly less restrictive than others in that it authorizes
appointment of the Parenting Coordinator on the court's motion - that
is, without the parties' consent - yet does not set forth any specific
findings that the trial court must make in order to justify the
appointment without consent of the parties. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-125
(West 2010) ("[U]pon agreement of the parties, the court's own
motion, or the motion of a party, the court may appoint a parenting
coordinator and refer the parties to parenting coordination to assist in
the resolution of disputes concerning their parenting plan."). Florida's
statute became effective on October 1, 2009. Thus, it has not yet been
addressed by a Florida appellate court. Allowing appointment without
consent or some findings renders the appointment vulnerable to
challenge, because the rationale for the intrusion is lessened without
consent or a finding that the appointment is in the best interest of the
children.
133

412
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parents consent to the appointment diminishes the strength
of any argument that the appointment is an improper
delegation of judicial authority.
In Oklahoma, a court can appoint a Parenting
Coordinator with or without consent of the parties.' 3 4 For
the court to appoint a Parenting Coordinator without the
consent of both parties, two criteria must be satisfied. First,
the court must make a finding that the case is a "highconflict case."'1 35 A "high-conflict case" under the
Oklahoma Parenting Coordinator Act is
any action for dissolution of marriage, legal
separation, paternity, or guardianship where minor
children are involved and the parties demonstrate
a pattern of ongoing litigation, anger and distrust,
verbal abuse, physical aggression or threats of
physical aggression, difficulty in communicating
about and cooperating in the care of their children,
or conditions that in the discretion of the court
warrant the appointment of a parenting
coordinator. 136
Secondly, the court must also make a specific finding that
the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator is in the best
interest7 of the minor child or children involved in the
case. 13

134

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(A) (West 2010).

135OKLA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(B)(1) (West 2010)..

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.2(2) (West 2010)..
137 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(B)(2) (West 2010). North
136

Carolina's Parenting Coordination statute is very similar to
Oklahoma's. It allows appointment with consent of the parties and
allows appointment without consent of the parties only upon specific
findings that the case is "a high-conflict case" and that the appointment
of the Parenting Coordinator is in the best interest of the children. N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-91 (West 2010).
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Similarly, in Colorado, a court can appoint a
Parenting Coordinator with or without consent of the
parties. 138 Absent consent of the parties, a Colorado court
may appoint a Parenting Coordinator only if the court finds
that (1) the parties have "failed to adequately implement
the parenting plan;" (2) mediation is inappropriate or has
been attempted and was unsuccessful; and (3) the
Coordinator is in the best
appointment of the Parenting
39
1
children.
the
of
interest
Likewise, in Louisiana, a Parenting Coordinator
may be appointed with 14 or without consent of both
parties. Absent consent of both parties, a Parenting
Coordinator may be appointed for "good cause." 14 1 There is
"good cause" for appointing a Parenting Coordinator when
a trial court determines that one or both of the parties (1)
are unable or unwilling to make parenting decisions with
one another without assistance of others or insistence of the
court, (2) are unable or unwilling to comply with parenting
agreements and orders, (3) have demonstrated an ongoing
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010). As discussed
in infra Part IX, Colorado provides for appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator with decision-making authority and a Parenting
Coordinator without decision-making authority. A Parenting
Coordinator without decision-making authority may be appointed
without consent upon the findings discussed here. COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-10-128. 1 (West 2010). However, a Parenting Coordinator
with decision-making authority can be appointed only with consent of
the parties. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.3(1) (West 2010).
139 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1(2)(a)(I)-(II) (West 2010);
138

see also In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 819 (Colo. Ct. App.
2008) (recognizing that, if the parties do not agree to the appointment,
the court must make certain findings before the appointment can be
made).
140 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:358.1(A) (2010) ("The court shall
make
the appointment on joint motion of the parties.").
,41 Id. ("On motion of a party or on its own motion, the
court may
appoint a parenting coordinator in a child custody case for good cause
shown if the court has previously entered a judgment establishing child
custody, other than an ex parte order.").
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pattern of unnecessary litigation, (4) refuse to communicate
or have difficulty in communicating about and cooperating
in the care of the children, and (5) refuse to acknowledge
the right of the other parent to have 42and maintain a
continuing relationship with the children.'
In Idaho, reference to a Parenting Coordinator may
be made with the parties' consent143 or when the trial court
has found that either (1) the issues appear to be intractable
or have been subject to frequent re-litigation, (2) the wellbeing of a minor child is placed at risk by the parents'

inability to co-parent civilly, or (3) other exceptional
circumstances require44 such appointment to protect the
child's best interests.1
The Texas Parenting Coordination statute is more
restrictive than the other Parenting Coordination statutes.

Other

statutes

allow

appointment

of

a

Parenting

Coordinator with both parents' consent even without the
142 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 9:358.1(A) (2010), Comment (c); Palazzolo

v. Mire, 10 So. 3d 748, 779 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:358.1(A) (2010), Comment (c)).
143 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(1)(3) ("The court, upon agreement of the parties
or after having found on the record that the circumstances specified in
[IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(1)(2)] are present, may appoint a Parenting
Coordinator in any action involving custody of minor children.").
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717D (current through the end of the 2010
Second Reg. Sess. of the 60th Legis.) provides statutory authorization
for court appointment of a Parenting Coordinator. However, criteria
and standards for qualifications, selection, appointment, termination of
appointment, and duties and responsibilities of a Parenting Coordinator
are set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court, id., which the court has done
in IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16.

144 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l). Arizona similarly provides that a court may
appointing a Parenting Coordinator if the court finds any of the
following: (1) that the parents are persistently in conflict with one
another; (2) a history of substance abuse by either parent or family
violence; (3) that there are serious concerns about the mental health or
behavior of either parent; (4) that a child has special needs; or (5) that it
would otherwise be in the children's best interests to appoint the
parenting coordinator. ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PROC. 74.
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trial court finding that, for example, the parents are high
conflict or that appointment is in the "best interest of the
children."' 145 The Texas statute prohibits appointment even
with consent of the parties unless the trial court makes
certain findings. Under the Texas statute, the court "may
not appoint a parenting coordinator unless the court makes
specific findings that" (1) the case is a high-conflict case or
there is good cause shown for the appointment and (2) the
appointment is in the best interest of any minor child in the
suit.

14 6

California is also restrictive regarding when a
Parenting Coordinator 47 can be appointed. Whereas Texas
requires a trial court's findings (consent of the parents
alone will not suffice), California requires consent from the
parents (trial court findings alone will not suffice). In
California, Parenting Coordination may be used only when
the parties consent.1 48 Parenting Coordination was at one
145

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010)

(requiring a trial court to make findings absent agreement of the
parties); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(B) (West 2010) (requiring a
trial court to make findings if a party objects); ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PROC.
74(A) ("parents may agree to use a Parenting Coordinator... subject to
approval by the court"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:358.1(A) (2010)
("The court shall make the appointment on joint motion of the
parties.")
146TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 153.605(b) (Vernon 2009) (emphasis

added).
147 AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 537 (stating that
Parenting Coordination in California is not called "Parenting
Coordination;" professionals who fulfill the Parenting Coordinator role
are called "special masters."). The statute that is relied upon as
providing authority for the Parenting Coordination role is California's
special master statute, id., which has broader application than just to
Parenting Coordination. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 730 (West 2011).
148 Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
Although the holding of Ruisi v. Thieriot might be interpreted more
narrowly, courts have subsequently interpreted it as a bar to
appointment without the consent of both parties. AFCC,
Implementation Issues, supra note 3, at 537; Coates et al., supra note 3,

416
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time widely used in California without consent, although
has never been authorized by statute. However, once a
court addressed the issue, it was determined that Parenting
Coordination could not occur without consent of the
parties. 149 The appointment depends on California's special
master statute, which does not allow reference to a special
master to the extent needed to fulfill the role of Parenting
Coordination without consent of the parties. 5 ° For
example, a Parenting Coordinator must necessarily
interpret existing court orders. The court viewed
interpretation of existing orders as a question of law, which
5
cannot be referred to a special master without consent.1 1
Appointment of a Parenting Coordinator also assumes that
the Parenting Coordinator will address disputes that are, at
the time of the appointment, unknown. California's special
master statute, however, does not provide authority to refer
unknown future disputes to a special master.' 52 Thus, the
court determined that the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator, who would interpret a court order and address
future disputes, could not stand without consent of the
parties.153 The California situation demonstrates that, when
the authority to appoint a Parenting Coordinator is lacking,
circumstances surrounding the Parenting Coordinator's
appointment and role must be adjusted to compensate for
the lack of authority.
at 249.
"4 Ruisi, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766; AFCC, Implementation Issues, supra
note 3, at 537.
' Ruisi, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774 (stating that the distinction between
reference to a special master with consent and reference without
consent is "carefully preserved in the statutes in order to comply with
the constitutional mandate").
151 Id. ("The trial court has no authority to refer questions of law ...
Disputes involving interpretation of the existing custody orders, for
example, may present questions of law.").
152 Id. ("The trial court has no authority to compel a reference of
unknown future disputes.").
153 Id.
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Where the parties consent to the appointment, their
ground for objection to the appointment is not wellfounded. Even where parties do not consent to the
appointment, if the trial court has made specific findings to
justify the appointment, such as a finding that the parents
are in high conflict or that the appointment of the Parenting
Coordinator is in the best interest of the children, the
additional intrusion into the family by appointing a
Parenting Coordinator may be justified. However, as
demonstrated by the California example, without an
enabling rule or statute, this is less likely to be true. Thus, a
court seeking to appoint a Parenting Coordinator with or
without an enabling statute is well advised to condition
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator on either the
consent of the parties or some factual findings of the trial
court that would justify appointment of the Parenting
Coordinator.
IX. Limitation on Parenting Coordination: Review
by Appointing Trial Court
The appointment of a Parenting Coordinator is more
likely to constitute an improper delegation of judicial
authority if the Parenting Coordinator exercises decisionmaking authority because decision making is the essence of
the judicial power.' 54 However, as discussed in Part V
above, the practical benefits of Parenting Coordination
dissipate as the Parenting Coordinator's decision-making
authority decreases. Thus, jurisdictions seeking to
implement an effective Parenting Coordination program
must find a balance. To maximize the benefits of Parenting
Coordination, the Parenting Coordinator should have some
degree of decision-making authority; on the other hand, the
Parenting Coordinator cannot be granted so much decisionmaking authority that the grant constitutes an improper
154

See supra note 71.
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delegation of judicial authority. There must be adequate
opportunity for review by the trial court.
Assigning the final decision-making authority to a
Parenting Coordinator is an improper delegation of judicial
authority; the parties must have the opportunity for the trial
court to review any decision of the Parenting Coordinator.
On the other hand, if the Parenting Coordinator's decision
has no binding effect and is subject to a lengthy and tedious
review process, one of the primary benefits of Parenting
Coordination - expeditious resolution of conflict - is
sacrificed. Thus, a legal and effective Parenting
Coordination program must strike a balance between
review that is adequate but is not so burdensome as to
render Parenting Coordination futile.
A. Review Required
Of the six states with a statute or court rule that
allows a Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making
authority, 55 five of them require that the Parenting
Coordinator's decision be subject to review by the trial
court. The statutes or court rules of three of them Arizona, 156 Colorado, 157 and North Carolina 158 - provide a
155Arizona,

Colorado, Florida, Idaho, North Carolina, and Oklahoma

have statutes or court rules allowing for decision-making by the
Parenting Coordinator. Louisiana, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont have
Parenting Coordination statutes, but they do not allow for decisionmaking authority.
156 In Arizona, a Parenting Coordinator may make a decision only when
a "short-term, emerging, and time sensitive situation or dispute" arises
that requires an "immediate decision for the welfare of the children and
parties." ARIZ. R. FAM. L. PROC. 74(G). In that situation, the Parenting
Coordinator's decision is temporary but binding. Id. It is, however,
subject to review and entry of an appropriate order at "the judge's
earliest opportunity." Id.
157 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.3(1) (West 2010). Colorado
allows the appointment of "decision-maker" upon consent of the
parties. Id.
The decision-maker has "binding authority" to resolve
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mechanism for judicial review of the Parenting
Coordinator's decision. Although Idaho's rule 159 and
Oklahoma's statute 16° do not specifically provide a
disputes regarding implementation or clarification of a preexisting
court order. Id. His decisions are immediately effective. Id. § 14-10128.3(3). However, a party may request that the trial court modify the
decision-maker's decision after a de novo hearing. Id. § 14-10128.3(4)(a). The court has discretion as to whether to grant the de novo
hearing. See id. § 14-10-128.3(4)(b).
158 North Carolina's Parenting Coordination statute allows the court to
authorize the Parenting Coordinator to "decide issues regarding the
implementation of the parenting plan that are not specifically governed
by the court order and which the parties are unable to resolve." N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-92 (West 2010). The Parenting Coordinator's
decision is binding until court review, but the parties may request an
"expedited hearing" to review a Parenting Coordinator's decision. Id. §
50-92(b) (West 2010).
159 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16 makes clear that the appointment
of a Parenting Coordinator does not "divest the court of its exclusive
jurisdiction to determine fundamental issues of custody, visitation, and
support...." IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l)(5). However, it also allows the
Parenting Coordinator to make some decisions. See, e.g., IDAHO R. Civ.
P. 16(l)(1) (stating that the Parenting Coordinator "will make decisions
or recommendations as may be appropriate when the parties are unable
to do so"). While the trial court may designate that some decisions of
the Parenting Coordinator shall be reviewed by the court before taking
effect, Rule 16 does not specifically provide that any and all decisions
of the Parenting Coordinator may be reviewed by the trial court.
However, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified in Hausladen v. Knoche,
that the language of Rule 16 does not give a Parenting Coordinator
judicial powers of decision making. 235 P.3d 399, 403 (Idaho 2010).
Instead, "the judicial function of final decision-maker remains with the
court and is not delegated." Id.
160 The Oklahoma Parenting Coordination statute, similar to the Idaho
Rule, see supra note 153, specifically states that the appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator does not "divest the court of its exclusive
jurisdiction to determine fundamental issues of custody, visitation, and
support . . . ." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3 (West Supp. 2011)).
However, the Oklahoma statute also allows the Parenting Coordinator
to make some decisions, id. § 120.3(A) (allowing appointment of a
Parenting Coordinator to "decide disputed issues"), some of which
shall be reviewed by the trial court before taking effect. Id. §
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mechanism for review therein, appellate courts of those
states have held that the Parenting161
Coordinator's decision
court.
trial
the
by
reviewed
be
must
Challenges to the appointment of a Parenting
Coordinator as an improper delegation of judicial authority
have been successful to the extent that the Parenting

120.3(C)(3). However, the Oklahoma statute does not specifically
provide that all decisions of a Parenting Coordinator are reviewable;
nevertheless, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has held that a
Parenting Coordinator's decision is conditional and temporary subject
to the court's review, noting that the trial court has the "ultimate
responsibility" as the arbiter of a child's best interest in custody
matters." Fultz v. Smith, 97 P.3d 651, 655 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
161 Florida is the only state whose statute provides for a Parenting
Coordinator to have decision-making authority but does not yet require
the opportunity for judicial review of the Parenting Coordinator's
decision. Florida's Parenting Coordination statute appears to allow the
Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making authority. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.125(1) (West Supp. 2011) (allowing the Parenting
Coordinator to "with the prior approval of the parents and the court,
mak[e] limited decisions within the scope of the court's order").
However, the statute provides no mechanism for judicial review of the
Parenting Coordinator's decision. See id.§ 61.125. However, Florida's
statute has been effective since only October 1,2009, and no Florida
appellate court has yet considered the issue. It is likely that a Florida
court considering the issue would hold that the Parenting Coordinator's
decision is not immune from judicial review. Cf Martin v. Martin, 734
So. 2d 1133, 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a court order
allowing a mediator absolute authority to establish a visitation schedule
for the parties must be stricken because the trial court could not
"delegate its judicial authority to ultimately resolve the issue and settle
disputes between the parties"). Martin v. Martin might, however, be
distinguishable from a Parenting Coordination case that may appear
before a Florida court in that the decision of the mediator in Martin
initially resolved the conflict whereas a Parenting Coordinator's
decision should be limited to resolving conflicts regarding a preexisting
court order. See Martin, 734 So. 2d 1133. Nonetheless, a holding that
the Parenting Coordinator's decision is completely immune from
review would be inconsistent with the decisions of other jurisdictions
addressing the same question. See, e.g., Hausladen 235 P.3d at 403;
Fultz, 97 P.3d at 655.
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Coordinator's decision was perceived to be final - not
subject to court review. A Parenting Coordinator's decision
should be subject to court review even where the parties
consent to the Parenting Coordinator's authority to make a
decision that is not reviewable by the court. 162
None of the five states discussed above that require
review by the trial court of any decision by the Parenting
Coordinator have considered the question of whether a
party could agree to the Parenting Coordinator's decision
being final - in other words, waive the right to review by
the trial court. However, it is the court's role to ultimately
safeguard the best interest of the children.' 63 Thus,
abrogation of that responsibility to any non-judicial
designee is probably not proper, be it by statute, by the
court's own decision, or by agreement of the parties.
In a state with a Parenting Coordination statute that
does not provide for decision-making authority, it has been
held that consent of the parties could not permit a Parenting
Coordinator to have decision-making authority without
court review; however, consent of the parties could permit
a Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making authority

162

Another consideration not addressed in this Article is what the

standard of review for a Parenting Coordinator's decision should be. At
least one court has indicated that it should be de novo. See Fultz, 97
P.3d at 654 ("The Act, in our view, clearly anticipates the trial court's
de novo consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case...
."). Review is de novo by statute in Colorado. See supranote 157.
163 See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 734 So. 2d 1133, 1136 (Fla. Ct. App.
1999) ("While a trial court can order the parties to mediate the issue of
visitation, it cannot delegate its judicial authority to ultimately resolve
the issue and settle disputes."); Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 198 P.3d 406,
410 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) ("Requiring [the Parenting Coordinator's]
recommendations to be viewed 'as orders of the Court' constitutes an
improper delegation of judicial power to the parenting coordinator and
is contrary to the parents' due process rights under the Oklahoma and
U.S. Constitutions." (citing Conaghan v. Riverfield Country Day
School, 163 P.3d 557 (Okla. 2007))).
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with court review. 164 In Heinonen v. Heinonen,16 5 the
Oregon Court of Appeals held that a trial court cannot
delegate final decision-making authority to a Parenting
Coordinator, even with consent of the parties.166 In
Heinonen, the parties entered into an agreement that
allowed the Parenting Coordinator to make decisions but
did not provide for the trial court's review of that decision.
Instead, the agreement provided that issues such as
visitation conflicts, interpretation of the clauses of the
parties' divorce decree, and scheduling conflicts not
anticipated by the decree "shall be within the province of
the [Parenting Coordinator] to resolve."' 167 The Oregon
Court of Appeals determined that allowing the Parenting
Coordinator to make a final decision would deprive the trial
court of its statutorily-mandated authority to determine
issues of child custody and visitation time as well as the
modification thereof. 168 An Oregon trial court's authority
is "wholly statutory," and no statute authorizes the trial
court to delegate that authority to a Parenting
Coordinator. 169 Thus, the delegation of final decisionmaking authority was impermissible even though the
parties had agreed to it. The court further reasoned that the
delegation would conflict with the legislature's policy that
the court develop a parenting plan and that the court

164

Heinonen v. Heinonen, 14 P.3d 96 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).

165 Id.

166

The Oregon statute does not use the term "Parenting Coordinator,"

but allows a court to appoint one to serve in that role. See OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 107.425(3)(a) (West 2010) (stating that a court may
"appoint an individual or a panel or may designate a program to assist
the court in creating parenting plans or resolving disputes regarding
parenting time and to assist parents in creating and implementing
plans").
parenting
67
1 Heinonen, 14 P.3d at 97.
8
16
Id.at 99.
169

Id.; see also supra note 63.
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and visitation in the best interest of the
modify custody
70
children. 1
However, in a later case, where the trial court would
review the Parenting Coordinator's decision - the trial
court had the ultimate decision-making authority - the
Oregon court held that the trial court could delegate initial
71
decision-making authority to the Parenting Coordinator.1
In Polacek v. Polacek,172 the parties entered into an
agreement to allow visitation "only as recommended by"
the Parenting Coordinator. 173 However, the agreement also
stated that a party had the option to challenge an adverse
recommendation and that the final decision rested with the
court. 174 The Oregon Court of Appeals held that that
agreement did not improperly delegate authority of the
designee because the final decision
court to a non-judicial
1 75
rested with the court.

B. Binding or Stayed Pending Review

170

The court did note, however, that nothing would prevent the parties

from entering into an agreement to use a mediator or arbitration to
reach a joint agreement as a result thereof and to stipulate into court
their joint decision. Heinonen, 14 P.3d at 99 n.3. However, whether
such a stipulation should be incorporated remains within the providence
of the court to decide. Id. It would still be within the role of the court to
ensure that the parties' agreement is consistent with the best interest of
the child. Id.
171 Polacek v. Polacek, 222 P.3d 732 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
172 id.
173

The recommendations were actually made by the child's therapist.

"Parenting Coordinator" is used here for consistency. See supra note
166 and accompanying text explaining that Oregon's statute does not
use the term "Parenting Coordinator," yet allows the court to appoint
someone to serve in that role; see also Kirkland, PC Laws, Rules and
Regulations, supra note 8 (discussing problems regarding inconsistency
of nomenclature across jurisdictions).
174 Polacek,222 P.3d, at 735.
175 id.
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Another consideration is whether the Parenting
Coordinator's reviewable decision is immediately effective
or is stayed until a prescribed time period for "appeal" to
the trial court has expired or the trial court has reviewed the
Parenting Coordinator's decision. It could be argued that,
where a Parenting Coordinator's decision is immediately
effective, it has the force and effect of a trial court order, if
only for a short time. In some circumstances, that "interim"
decision could effectively be the final decision. For
example, if a Parenting Coordinator makes a decision
regarding an upcoming visitation weekend and that
weekend comes and goes before the trial court review. In
such a situation, the Parenting Coordinator's decisionmaking authority is arguably an improper delegation of
judicial authority.
The Oklahoma Parenting Coordination statute
provides that certain types of decisions made by a
Parenting Coordinator are "immediately effective" and
76
some require court approval before coming into effect.'
Perhaps somewhat contrary to its own statute, which allow
some decisions to be effective without review, the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has held that treating a
Parenting Coordinator's recommendation as an "order of
the court" constitutes an improper delegation of judicial

76

43, § 120.3(C) (West 2010) (providing that a
court order appointing a Parenting Coordinator shall specify which
1 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

"determinations will be immediately effective and which will require
an opportunity for court review prior to taking effect"). Idaho's
Parenting Coordination rule also provides that some types of Parenting
Coordinator decisions are effective without previous court review.
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(l)(8) (stating "decisions with respect to matters
submitted under [Rule 16(l)] 5(B) will be effective when
communicated to the parties. Recommendations under [Rule 16(l)]
5(C) will be effective fourteen (14) days after submission to the
court.") The North Carolina statute provides the same, but allows for a
party to petition the court for "expedited" review. N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-92(b) (West 2010).
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power to the Parenting Coordinator.17 7 In some
circumstances, an immediately effective recommendation,
although subject to review, could be the functional
equivalent of an order of the court. 78 Thus, allowing the
Parenting Coordinator to make such a determination may
actually constitute an improper delegation of judicial
authority.

1 79

A Kentucky court has impliedly rejected a similar
argument.' 80 In Telek v. Bucher, a father argued that the
appointment of a Parenting Coordinator was essentially an
order to participate in binding arbitration and that the
appointment constituted an improper delegation of judicial
authority to a third party.181 The trial court had ordered the
177

Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 198 P.3d 406, 410 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009).

Although the Kilpatrick court did not directly address the provision of
the Parenting Coordinator statute that allows for a court order to
designated certain parts of a Parenting Coordinator's recommendations
to be "immediately effective," the court said that requiring the
Parenting Coordinator's recommendations to be viewed "'as orders of
the Court' constitutes an improper delegation of judicial power to the
parenting coordinator, and is contrary to the parents' due process rights
under the Oklahoma and U.S. Constitutions."
e.g., hypothetical at supra p. 401.
178
179 See,
See Fultz
v. Smith, 97 P.3d 651, 654 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (stating
that the Act clearly makes any decision of the Parenting Coordinator
"conditional and temporary subject to the court's review on timely
objection."). However, that seems to disregard the language of the
Oklahoma statute that allows at least some decision of the Parenting
Coordinator to be immediately binding, at least until court review,
which will apparently take about twenty days.
180 Telek v. Bucher, No. 2008-CA-002149-ME, 2010 WL 1253473
(Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2010).
181Id. at *5. A similar argument was rejected by a Tennessee court.
Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, No. M2006-02645-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112538
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2009). The wife in Nesbitt argued that the
Parenting Coordinator was a "substitute Judge who is authorized to
make recommendations, effective immediately as Orders, which violate
the most fundamental constitutional rights." Id. at *6 (quoting the
wife's argument). The appellate court, however, interpreted the order
appointing the Parenting Coordinator as simply allowing the Parenting
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parties to "participate in Parenting Coordination."',8 2 The
father argued the process was essentially binding
arbitration because he was forced to abide by the Parenting
Coordinator's determination to which he objected during
the period of time that it would take to obtain a final
decision from the court. 183
The court did not squarely address the father's
argument. Instead, it was convinced that the Parenting
Coordinator was "simply supervising the court's orders" to
ensure that the terms of its orders are carried out.' 84 The
court emphasized that the Parenting Coordinator is to make
a decision that complies with the pre-existing orders of the
court and that such decisions are to be made only 1 in
85
instances where the parties cannot reach an agreement.
In addition, where a party disagrees with the Parenting
Coordinator's determination, he can seek a final
determination from the court.' 86 Because the Parenting
Coordinator would make decisions that were consistent
with the court's order and the trial court could review the
decision, the court was not apparently troubled by the fact
that the parties would be bound by the Parenting
Coordinator's decisions in the interim. 187
C. Expediency

Coordinator to make recommendations, not decisions, and thus did not
find the Parenting Coordinator's responsibilities to impose on the
court's authority. Id.
182 Telek, 2010 WL 1253473 at *5.The court described a Parenting
Coordination as "a type of counseling service for parents who are
unable to communicate or reach agreements regarding the day-to-day
arrangements of their children." Id.
custody
8
1 3 Id.
184

Id. (referring to the guardian ad litem's argument).

185

Id.

186

Id.
Id.

187
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Perhaps the court in Telek recognized that, if the
Parenting Coordinator's decision has no binding effect, one
of the primary benefits of Parenting Coordination,
expeditious resolution of conflict, is sacrificed. Of course,
the trial court's review must be meaningful, but the
Parenting Coordination process must be meaningful as well
if the process is to be useful. If a Parenting Coordinator's
decision is subject to a stringent review process, its utility
is questionable at best.
For example, the review provision of the Oklahoma
statute discussed in Part IX.B. above appears to be
inconsistent with one of the purposes of Parenting
Coordination, which is to facilitate expedient conflict
resolution. Although a decision of a Parenting Coordinator
l
is binding on the parties until further order of the court, 8
the statute provides that decisions of the Parenting
Coordinator "shall be filed with the court within twenty
(20) days."' 1 89 Objections to the Parenting Coordinator's
decisions or recommendations should be filed within ten
days,190 and responses to the objections filed ten days
thereafter. 19' Then, the court shall review the objections
'1 92
and responses and "thereafter enter appropriate orders."
The trial court's review of the Parenting Coordinator's
recommendation or decision is de novo.193 Given the period
188

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(B) (West 2010) ("Any decisions

made by the parenting coordinator authorized by the court order and
issued pursuant to the provisions of the Parenting Coordinator Act shall
be binding on the parties until further order of the court.").
189 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(A)
190 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(C)(1). The court may order
objections to be filed within a different time period. Id.
'99 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(C)(2).
192 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.4(D).
193Fultz v. Smith, 97 P.3d 651, 654 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) ("The Act,
in our view, clearly anticipates the trial court's de novo consideration of
all the facts and circumstances of the case, grants discretionary
authority to the trial court to accept or reject the PC's decision, and
permits the trial court to enter 'an appropriate order' as the
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for objection and the de novo review, this process does not
provide for particularly expedient resolution of conflict.
D. Balance
A balance must be struck between review that is
sufficiently meaningful that the Parenting Coordinator's
decision-making authority does not usurp judicial powers
but is sufficiently limited so that the utility of the Parenting
Coordinator process is not diminished to the point of being
futile. Given the fine line between "too much" and "not
enough" decision-making authority, the question is raised
whether the benefits of Parenting Coordination warrant
walking that line. To answer that question, compare the
situation of high-conflict parents with irreconcilable
differences regarding a minor change to the visitation
schedule for a soon-upcoming holiday with and without the
benefits of a Parenting Coordinator. Would these highconflict parents, who cannot reach an agreement with the
assistance of the Parenting Coordinator, be better situated if
they were to avoid the Parenting Coordination process
altogether? The answer is probably "no."
The Parenting Coordination process provides the
parents with a better possibility for resolving the conflict.
Without the Parenting Coordination process, the highconflict parents who could not reach an agreement with the
assistance of the Parenting Coordinator are not likely to
reach an agreement if left to their own devices. Instead,
they will have to resort to the court and wait. They will not
likely get a decision from the trial court sooner than they
would have gotten a decision from a Parenting Coordinator.
In contrast, with the Parenting Coordination process, the
parents will have some decision made in a timely manner.
Because it increases the likelihood of agreement and allows
circumstances of the case warrant, whether in agreement with or
contrary to the decision of the PC.").
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for expedient decisions, even with the required review, the
Parenting Coordination process is superior to the
alternative, a court decision that could come so late as to be
meaningless.
Although one of the parties will be bound by an
adverse decision until the court reviews it, one of the
parties will be aggrieved and bound by the court decision if
the parties were to initially go to court, assuming their issue
could even get before the court in time for a meaningful
decision to be made. One might argue that allowing a
Parenting Coordinator's decision to be binding pending
appeal, and the possibility that the matter about which the
parents are in dispute may pass during the pendency, the
review of the Parenting Coordinator's decision is likewise a
court decision that comes so late as to be meaningless. That
argument is perhaps legitimate. But, as set out above, the
same is true without the Parenting Coordination process;
the parties may not be able to get before a judge before the
matter in dispute passes. Thus, either with or without
Parenting Coordination, a decision may be made by the
trial court so late that that decision is not meaningful. In
contrast, with the Parenting Coordination process, there is
at least some decision made by some neutral party in a
manner that it sufficiently timely as to be meaningful.
"Staying" the effectiveness of a Parenting Coordinator's
decision until the parties can go before the court for
approval undermines the role of the Parenting Coordinator,
which is to facilitate expedient resolution of conflicts.
The judicial review component of the Parenting
Coordination process is necessary to uphold the Parenting
Coordination process. However, any decision by the
Parenting Coordinator should be binding pending review in
order to fulfill one of the primary purposes of Parenting
Coordination: to reach decisions in a timely manner to the
benefit of the parents and their children.
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X. Further Limitations on the
Coordinator's Decision-Making Authority
A. Consent to the
Decision-Making Authority

Parenting

Parenting

Coordinator's

Another means of protecting against a challenge to
a Parenting Coordinator's decision-making authority is to
require that the parties consent - beyond the mere
appointment of the Parenting Coordinator - specifically to
the Parenting Coordinator having decision-making
authority. 194 Some jurisdictions allow the Parenting
Coordinator to have decision-making authority only with
the parties' specific consent to the Parenting Coordinator's
decision-making authority. In Colorado, what it calls a
"Parenting Coordinator" is not authorized to make
decisions' 95 but, in conjunction with its Parenting
Coordinator statute, Colorado authorizes the appointment
of a "domestic relations decision-maker" who is in essence
196
a Parenting Coordinator with decision-making authority.
A "decision-maker" can be appointed only with the consent

194

Cf Allison Glade Behjani, Delegation of Judicial Authority to

Experts: Professional and Constitutional Implications of Special
Masters in Child-Custody Proceedings, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 823, 835
(2007) (offering as a possible solution to constitutional problems
associated with having special masters involved in custody matters
allowing reference to a special master only with the parents consent to
the reference).
195 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.1 (West 2010);
see In re
Marriage of Dauwe, 148 P.3d 282, 285 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding that
provision of court order that purported to give the Parenting
Coordinator authority to "resolve the differences between the parents
when they cannot agree" granted decision-making authority to the
Parenting Coordinator and was contrary to Colorado's Parenting
Coordination statute).
196 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-128.3 (West
2010).
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of the parties.' 97 In Florida, a court is prohibited from
granting a Parenting Coordinator any decision-making
98
authority without the consent of the parties.1
In Oregon, even though the Parenting Coordination
statute does not provide for the Parenting Coordinator to
have decision-making authority, a court has allowed a
Parenting Coordinator to make decisions if the parties
99
consent to it. Oregon's Parenting Coordination statute'
does not grant the Parenting Coordinator decision-making
authority; however, in Polacek v. Polacek,2 °° the parties
agreed to allow visitation "only as recommended by" the
Parenting Coordinator 2° ' and the court upheld this decisionmaking authority because, in part, of the parties' consent to
that authority.
Pennsylvania, which does not have a Parenting
Coordination statute, has also allowed the use of a
Parenting Coordinator to make decisions with the consent
of the parties. In Yates v. Yates, the trial court delegated to
the Parenting Coordinator "only ancillary custody disputes,
such as determining temporary variances in the custody
schedule, exchanging information and communication, and
coordinating [the child's] recreational and extracurricular

197

Id. ("at any time after the entry of an order concerning parental

responsibilities and upon written consent of both parties, the court may
appoint a qualified domestic relations decision-maker and grant to the
decision-maker binding authority to resolve disputes between the
parties as to implementation or clarification of existing orders...").
198FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.125 (West 2010) (allowing the Parenting
Coordinator to, "with the prior approval of the parents and the court,
mak[e] limited decisions within the scope of the court's order of
referral").
199 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.425(3)(a) (West 2010).
200In re Marriage of Polacek, 222 P.3d 732, 735 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
201 See supra note 170.
202 The court's decision was also based on part on the fact that the
Parenting Coordinator's decision was subject to review by the
appointment trial court. See supra Part IX.A.
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activities., 20 3 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
determined that allowing the Parenting Coordinator to
make decisions about those issues was not an improper
delegation of judicial authority in part because the parties
had consented to the decision-making authority of the
Parenting Coordinator. 204
Requiring the parties' consent in order for the
Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making authority is
not always necessary. However, such a requirement will
weaken a subsequent argument that granting decisionmaking authority to the Parenting Coordinator was an
improper delegation of judicial authority. Thus, where
specific statutory or rule-based authority is lacking, such a
requirement may be prudent.
B. Limiting the Decision-Making Authority to
Specific Issues
Limiting a Parenting Coordinator's decision-making
authority to very specific "minor" issues can also protect
against an argument that granting the Parenting
20 5
Coordinator decision-making authority is improper.
Where the issues on which a Parenting Coordinator may
make a decision are minor or "ancillary" to the court's
20 6
order, his decision-making authority is less problematic.
Some statutes limit the issues on which Parenting
Coordinators may have decision-making authority. Others
recognize that some issues should not be decided by a
Parenting Coordinator but leaves it for a trial court to
203 Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
204 i.

205 See Behjani, supra note 194, at 835 (offering as a possible solution

to constitutional problems associated with having special masters

involved in custody matters allowing reference to a special master only
regarding "small factual disputes").
206 See, e.g., Yates, 963 A.2d 535.
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delineate the issues on which the Parenting Coordinator
may have decision-making authority.
The Idaho Rule providing for Parenting
Coordination lists matters in which a Parenting Coordinator
may or may not make a decision. It gives examples, "[b]y
way of illustration and not limitation," of what matters a
trial court may authorize a Parenting Coordinator to
determine. A Parenting Coordinator in Idaho may be
granted the authority to make decisions regarding: (1)
time, place, and manner of pickup and delivery of the
children; (2) child care arrangements; (3) minor alterations
in parenting schedule with respect to weeknight, weekend,
or holiday visitation that do not substantially alter the basic
time share allocation; (4) participation by significant others
and relatives in visitation; (5) first and last dates for
summer visitation; (6) schedule and conditions of telephone
communication with the children; (7) manner and methods
by which the parties may communicate with each other; (8)
approval of out-of-state travel plans; and (9) any other
issues submitted for immediate determination by agreement
of the parties. 20 7 In contrast, a Parenting Coordinator may
not be authorized by a court order to make decisions on
certain issues. On the following issues, a Parenting
Coordinator may make only recommendations to the court:
(1) which parent may authorize counseling or treatment for
a child; (2) which parent may select a school; (3)
supervision of visitation; (4) submission to a custody
evaluation; (5) appointment of an attorney or guardian ad
litem for a child; and (6) financial matters including child
support, health insurance, allocation of dependency
exemptions and other tax benefits, liability for particular
expenditures for a child.20 8
A legislature or court rule establishing a list such as
the above indicates that the rule-making body has
207 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(i)(5)(B).
208 IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(i)(5)(C).
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preemptively made some determination as to those kinds of
issues that would constitute an unlawful delegation of
judicial authority and those that would not. Another
interesting aspect of Idaho's Parenting Coordinator rule is
the language that prefaces the above lists and generally
describes a Parenting Coordinator's decision-making
authority. Idaho allows Parenting Coordinator to make
decisions only insofar as necessary to serve the best
interest of the rule. The rule provides that:
The Parenting Coordinator will make such
decisions or recommendations as may be
appropriate when the parties are unable to do so.
The goal of the Parenting Coordinator should
always be to empower the parents in developing
and utilizing adaptive parenting skills so that they
can resume the parenting and decision making role
in regard to their own children. When it is not
possible for the parents to agree, the Parenting
Coordinator shall provide only the amount of
direction and service required in order to serve
the best interest of the child by minimizing
the
2 9
0
parties.
the
between
conflict
of
degree
This provision quite wisely strikes a balance: it
grants Parenting Coordinator decision-making authority,
thus achieving the benefits of Parenting Coordinator, but
professes to go only so far as necessary to promote the best
interests of the children. Thus, this limitation perhaps
insulates the rule from a challenge that it improperly
delegates judicial authority to a Parenting Coordinator.
Arizona's rule of court allowing for a Parenting
Coordinator appointment also limits the issues on which a
Parenting Coordinator may make a decision, but that
limitation is to exigent circumstances. Arizona's rule does
209 IDAHO R.

CIv. P. 16(i)(1) (emphasis added).
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not grant the Parenting Coordinator any decision-making
authority outside of the following provision, which allows
for decision making in times of exigency:
When a short-term, emerging, and time sensitive
situation or dispute within the scope of authority
of the Parenting Coordinator arises that requires
an immediate decision for the welfare of the
children and parties, a Parenting Coordinator may
make a binding temporary decision. 210
Like Idaho's rule, this achieves some balance of granting
enough decision-making authority for effectiveness but not
so much as to constitute an improper delegation of judicial
authority, although in a different way.
Rather than specifying the issues on which a
Parenting Coordinator may make a decision, some
jurisdictions require specification, but leave it to the trial
court to delineate which issues may be decided by the
Parenting Coordinator. Oklahoma is one example; it
provides that:
The parenting coordinator shall not make any
modification to any order, judgment or decree;
however, the parenting coordinator may allow the
parties to make minor temporary departures from
a parenting plan if authorized by the court to do
so. The appointment order should specify those
coordinator is
matters which the parenting
21
authorized to determine. 1

210

ARIz. R. FAM. L. P. 74(G). The decision

is subject to review. Id.

("The decision shall be submitted to the assigned judge with a copy to
the parties (or counsel, if represented) in a written report that shall
document all substantive issues addressed and the basis for the decision
for review and entry of any appropriate orders at the judge's earliest
opportunity.").
211 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 120.3(C)(3) (West 2010).
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Specifically limiting the issues on which the
Parenting Coordinator may make a decision is wise. Either
the legislative body or court establishing the Parenting
Coordination program should limit the issues, striking a
balance between not allowing the Parenting Coordinator to
make decisions that are invasive of the trial court's domain
but are merely ancillary to the decision that the trial court
has already made and allowing the Parenting Coordinator
to make decisions on enough issues that his role is
meaningful and provides the benefits that Parenting
Coordination is intended to convey. Whether the issues on
which a Parenting Coordinator may make a decision are
specifically limited by statute or court rule or by the order
for appointment, limiting the Parenting Coordinator's
decision to issues that are ancillary to and within the scope
of the already-existing trial court order is wise. Narrowing
decision-making authority of the Parenting Coordinator
protects against argument that it is an improper delegation
of judicial authority but at the same time allows Parenting
Coordination to bestow the benefits as intended.
XI. Conclusion
Parenting Coordination has the potential to bestow
substantial benefits on parents, children, and the court
system. However, the appointment does pose potential
problems regarding improper delegation of judicial
authority. A Parenting Coordination program can be
viewed as a serious governmental intrusion into the day-today matters of a parent-child relationship if the role is not
properly circumscribed. The role should be properly limited
so that Parenting Coordination can bestow the benefits that
it intends but also does not constitute an improper
delegation of judicial authority.
Where the parameters of the role have not been set
out in advance, lawyers, and perhaps even judges, might
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not understand the Parenting Coordinator's role or how a
Parenting Coordination program should operate within the
existing constraints of the law. The potential
misunderstanding contributes to the vulnerability of the
appointment. A holding of invalidity could have
implications not only for the instant appointment, but for
the future of Parenting Coordination in that jurisdiction.
A jurisdiction that seeks to implement a proper and
legal program, or a trial court judge who seeks to appoint a
Parenting Coordinator without statutory or rule-based
authority, must carefully consider limitations that are
necessary or desired in the given jurisdiction so that
Parenting Coordination can provide parents, children, and
the state the benefits it offers. A Parenting Coordination
program must achieve an appropriate balance between
various legal aspects of a Parenting Coordination program
including: the stage in litigation at which appointment will
be allowed; under what conditions appointment will be
allowed; whether the Parenting Coordinator will have
decision-making authority; the reviewability of the
Parenting Coordinator's decisions; and the limitations on
the Parenting Coordinator's decision-making authority.
Achieving the appropriate balance will mitigate the
argument that the appointment is an improper delegation of
judicial authority. However, the balance is a delicate one;
Parenting Coordination will lose its utility if a proper
balance is not achieved. For example, the Parenting
Coordinator should have a sufficient degree of decisionmaking authority that Parenting Coordination is not merely
another hoop for the parents to jump through on their way
to court, yet not so much that the appointment is improper.
In addition, the appointment must be limited to qualified
professionals or else one of the essential components of and
rationales for Parenting Coordination - guiding the parents
with a goal of avoiding future conflict - is eviscerated.
Furthermore, the legal permissibility of a Parenting
Coordination program will depend on whether the
438
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Parenting Coordinator appointment is authorized by statute,
court rule, or must rest on some other authority such as the
trial court's inherent authority. For example, where
Parenting Coordination is specifically authorized by a
state's statute, it might be properly ordered and the
Parenting Coordinator might have decision-making
authority without consent of the parties. In contrast, where
Parenting Coordination is not authorized by a statute or
court rule, a jurisdiction would be wise to allow the
Parenting Coordinator to have decision-making authority
only with consent of the parties. Those limitations should
increase in degree where the basis for the authority is lesser
in degree. Weighed against the benefits to the children of
divorce, whose best interests the state is obligated to
protect, and the state itself, the balance tips in favor of
Parenting Coordination.
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